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ABSTRACT
In response to the turmoil in global ﬁ  nancial 
markets which began in the second half of 
2007, central banks have changed the way 
in which they implement monetary policy. 
This has drawn particular attention to the type 
of collateral used for backing central banks’ 
temporary open market operations and the range 
of counterparties which can participate in these 
operations. This paper provides an overview 
of the features of the different operational and 
collateral frameworks of three central banks that 
have been signiﬁ  cantly affected by the crisis: 
the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System 
and the Bank of England. The paper describes 
the factors that shaped the three frameworks 
prior to the turmoil. It then describes the actions 
the three central banks took in response to 
the turmoil and analyses to what extent these 
actions were dependent on the initial design of 
the operational and collateral framework.
Keywords: Collateral Framework, Central 
Bank Repo Auctions, Collateral, Open 
Market Operations, Financial Market Turmoil 
2007-2009
JEL classiﬁ  cation: E52, E58, G01, G205
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Prior to the ﬁ   nancial market turmoil that 
began in 2007, the Eurosystem, the Federal 
Reserve System and the Bank of England 
had very different operational frameworks 
for the implementation of monetary policy, in 
particular regarding the type of securities that 
were eligible as collateral for obtaining credit 
from the central bank. The Eurosystem, on 
the one hand, accepted a very broad range of 
collateral in its main open market operations, 
and also allowed a broad range of banks to 
participate. Furthermore, Eurosystem open 
market operations were of large size and 
there was no differentiation in the interest 
rate charged in the auctions depending on 
the type of collateral. The Federal Reserve, 
in contrast, only accepted government and 
quasi-government securities as collateral in 
its temporary operations, operating with a 
narrow group of less than 20 counterparties. 
Furthermore, its temporary operations were 
of a small size, and the Federal Reserve even 
charged different interest rates in the auctions 
depending on the type of collateral in order to 
minimise any impact of its operations on asset 
prices. The Bank of England ranged somewhat 
between these two extremes, but clearly 
closer to the Federal Reserve’s model than the 
Eurosystem’s.
This paper explains what factors, both 
external and internal, may have affected the 
choice of collateral and other differences in 
the operational frameworks. External factors 
include the legal constraints under which the 
central bank operates, as well as the depth and 
liquidity of the country’s capital markets and 
the structure of its banking system. Internal 
factors include how the central bank chooses 
to supply liquidity to the banking sector 
(i.e. whether mainly through outright or 
temporary operations), the importance the 
central bank places on not affecting market 
prices of assets, whether the central bank 
differentiates collateral eligibility according 
to the type of operation, and whether it applies 
large or small reserve requirements.
Following the start of the ﬁ  nancial  market 
turmoil, which turned into the equivalent of 
a traditional bank run but taking place in the 
wholesale funding markets, it became clear that 
central banks needed to provide banks with funds 
against less liquid collateral in order to prevent 
a systemic crisis. The Federal Reserve and the 
Bank of England, which at the outset of the 
turmoil had a narrower range of counterparties 
and collateral, expanded their operations 
signiﬁ  cantly. In particular, both central banks 
started to accept asset-backed securities issued 
by the private sector as collateral, the asset class 
which had triggered the turmoil and had turned 
the most illiquid due to uncertainties about 
credit quality and valuation. The Eurosystem’s 
framework, in contrast, which had already for 
many years accepted asset-backed securities as 
collateral in its liquidity-providing operations, 
was  ﬂ   exible enough to accommodate banks’ 
additional demand for liquidity with relatively 
few adjustments.
By the spring of 2009, the Federal Reserve had 
adopted such a large range of new facilities that 
the amount of liquidity provision – measured by 
four criteria: the size of the operations, the type 
of collateral, the range of eligible counterparties 
and the interest rate – was equivalent or arguably 
more ‘accommodative’ than the Eurosystem’s. 
However, this turned out to be a temporary 
phenomenon, as many of the Federal Reserve’s 
programmes began to automatically unwind as 
market conditions started to improve during the 
summer and autumn of 2009 and the provision of 
liquidity decreased quite markedly. At the same 
time, with the introduction of the Eurosystem’s 
one-year main reﬁ  nancing  operation  in 
the summer of 2009, the Eurosystem’s 
liquidity provision continued to remain rather 
accommodative.
The high level of what might be called “liquidity 
insurance” provided by the Eurosystem both 
before and after the start of the crisis certainly 
has beneﬁ   ts in terms of an immediate crisis 
mitigation tool. There was no time delay 
necessary before implementing new facilities, 
and the framework provided a very high 6
ECB
Occasional Paper No 107
December 2009
degree of ﬂ  exibility for banks to minimise their 
funding liquidity risk, without prompting ﬁ  re 
sales. Of course, these beneﬁ   ts of a “broad” 
framework have to be weighed against potential 
disadvantages, in particular the higher risks 
of accepting more illiquid collateral and the 
associated challenges for the risk control 
framework. Furthermore, the acceptance of 
a broad range of collateral in regular, large 
scale temporary central bank operations may 
undermine the incentive for banks prudently to 
manage liquidity risk.7
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I   INTRODUCTION
1 INTRODUCTION
Central banks implement monetary policy by 
steering short-term market interest rates close to 
the central banks’ policy rate.1 Normally, the 
steering of interest rates is achieved by 
conducting liquidity-providing, or absorbing, 
operations with private sector ﬁ  nancial 
institutions (“counterparties”) via discretionary 
temporary open market operations which are 
initiated by the central bank. Central banks also 
normally offer a liquidity providing standing 
facility, where counterparties can borrow at any 
time on their own initiative although only at 
a penal rate, and a deposit facility, whereby 
counterparties can have excess funds 
remunerated although only at below market 
rates. Traditionally standing facility operations – 
both the marginal lending facility and the 
deposit facility – were also used to steer interest 
rates on a day-to-day basis, but now they mainly 
play a supporting role, acting as a ceiling on 
and a ﬂ  oor to market interest rates. 
Central banks can also conduct two other types 
of liquidity-providing operations, which are 
generally not related to the day-to-day steering 
of interest rates, namely outright operations and 
intraday credit operations. Outright operations 
are normally associated with the management 
of an “outright asset portfolio”, which often 
mirrors the long-term trend increase in the 
issuance of currency in circulation (e.g. in the 
case of the central banks of the US and Japan). 
Intraday credit operations are used by the central 
bank in its role at the centre of the payment 
system, to facilitate the settlement of intraday 
payment  ﬂ   ows between institutions that hold 
their accounts at the central bank.
Outright operations involve the purchase of 
securities in the “open market”, which are 
normally kept on the central bank’s balance 
sheet until maturity.2 In contrast, temporary open 
market operations, standing credit facilities, and 
intraday credit are all forms of collateralised 
lending (i.e. credit operations) in which central 
bank money is granted to counterparties at a 
ﬁ   xed maturity against certain eligible assets,3 
which act as security in the event that the 
counterparty does not repay. Unlike in outright 
operations, the central bank does not become the 
permanent owner of the securities in temporary 
operations.4 
The potentially wide range of operations 
available to central banks provides signiﬁ  cant 
ﬂ   exibility to operate effectively in a wide 
range of different market conditions. This 
ﬂ  exibility proved particularly pertinent during 
the prolonged difﬁ  culties in ﬁ  nancial markets 
in 2007-2009, when many central banks had 
to innovate in terms of liquidity-providing 
operations in order to deal with speciﬁ  c problems 
among banks and ﬁ  nancial markets.
This paper provides an overview of the speciﬁ  c 
features of the different collateral frameworks 
of three central banks that have been signiﬁ  cantly 
affected by the crisis: the Eurosystem, 
US Federal Reserve and Bank of England. 
It explains why their frameworks were 
established in the way that they were, and how 
this had an impact on the responses of the three 
central banks to the turmoil in terms of using 
innovative liquidity-providing operations or 
introducing new types of collateralised lending 
facilities. The paper is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 describes the operational context and 
the factors that shaped the original design of the 
collateral frameworks. Chapter 3 describes the 
actions central banks took in response to the 
turmoil and how these actions were affected 
by the set-up of the operational and collateral 
framework prior to the turmoil. Chapter 4 
Annex 1 summarises the main features of the monetary policy  1 
operational frameworks of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve 
and the Bank of England.
As the volume of banknotes in circulation has a fairly stable  2 
and predictable long-term upward trend, outright purchases 
of securities can normally be held to maturity without it being 
necessary to sell prior to maturity.
In the case of the Federal Reserve, intraday credit is not  3 
collateralised up to certain overdraft limits.
In a repurchase (or “repo”) transaction using the usual master  4 
repo agreements, the central bank legally becomes the owner of 
the securities, but only for the period of the transaction. In the 
case of central bank lending operations based on a “pledge” of 
the collateral, the counterparty remains the owner of the security 
and the central bank only needs to resort to appropriation 
procedures in the event of default.8
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speciﬁ   cally compares the role of temporary 
open market operations in the three central 
banks’ responses to the crisis, using a range of 
criteria to determine how accommodative they 
have been in alleviating strains in wholesale 
interbank markets and dislocated asset markets. 
Chapter 5 contains the conclusions and suggests 
avenues for future research. 9
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2   FACTORS  INFLUENCING 
THE COLLATERAL 
FRAMEWORK
2  FACTORS INFLUENCING THE COLLATERAL 
FRAMEWORK
It is a universal central banking principle that 
credit should only be granted to private sector 
counterparties against collateral. There are 
several reasons why collateralised (or “secured”) 
lending is preferable to unsecured lending, but 
the most important is that it protects the central 
bank against ﬁ  nancial losses.5 Central banks are 
public sector institutions so they have an 
obligation to act prudently with taxpayers’ 
money; signiﬁ   cant losses may threaten the 
central bank’s reputation. Furthermore, if a 
central bank were to incur very large losses, it 
might risk losing its credibility in maintaining 
price stability.6
Although the requirement for collateral is 
frequently included in a central bank’s statute, 
the central bank itself normally decides what 
constitutes “sufﬁ  cient” or “adequate” collateral. 
The principal objective of ensuring a very high 
degree of protection against ﬁ  nancial loss could, 
in theory, be achieved in two ways: (i) either 
by only accepting assets with a very low credit, 
market and liquidity risk, e.g. government 
bonds; or (ii) by accepting a wider range of 
collateral, with varying degrees of credit, market 
and liquidity risk, but applying sufﬁ  ciently 
high valuation “haircuts” (i.e. reducing by a 
certain percentage  7 the value of the collateral 
against which lending is provided) or other risk 
control measures to ensure that the residual 
ﬁ  nancial risks, after the collateralisation and the 
application of the risk control framework, are 
identical to the ﬁ  rst approach. 
In private interbank repo markets, there is a 
strong tendency to opt for the former approach, 
with the vast majority of collateral consisting 
of government bonds; repo markets in 
non-government bond collateral are still 
negligible in most developed countries, 
with the exception of US agency bonds.8 
For example, according to a December 2008 
survey by the European Repo Council, 83.6% 
of the outstanding €4.6 trillion private repo 
transactions in Europe are collateralised by 
government bonds. Similarly, in the US, 
prior to the crisis, the percentage of central 
government bond collateral in the total 
outstanding repo transactions was also high, at 
approximately 81%.9 
Within the central banking community, however, 
there is much more variation. Some central banks 
(e.g. the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England 
and the Bank of Canada) have tended to adhere 
more strictly to the ﬁ   rst approach, accepting 
only central government or quasi-government 
bonds for open market operations. Other central 
banks (e.g. the Eurosystem and Bank of Japan), 
Secured lending also removes the burdensome task of having to  5 
monitor very actively individual counterparties’ creditworthiness, 
as well as of calculating and monitoring credit limits. It may also 
help to guard against adverse selection, i.e. the fact that, in the 
absence of limits, the borrowers from the central bank would 
tend to be those with the lowest creditworthiness.
In theory, central banks could operate with negative capital  6 
indeﬁ  nitely, and might only need recapitalisation if it were to 
have very large liabilities denominated in a foreign currency 
which it could not repay by creating domestic currency, or if the 
economy were to enter a very strong deﬂ  ationary spiral, which 
would not allow the central bank to return to proﬁ  tability through 
its seigniorage revenue. Of course, this does not take into account 
what may happen to the ability to control inﬂ  ation as a result of 
negative public expectations of a central bank having negative 
equity. For further information, see, for instance, Cincibuch, 
Holub and Hurnik (2008) and Bindseil, Manzanares and 
Weller (2004).
For example, assume that a bond on day T has a market value  7 
at par 100 and the central bank applies a 5% haircut to such 
collateral in its credit operations. The counterparty would be 
able to borrow only 95 against such collateral. Furthermore, 
if the market price were to decrease to 90 the following day 
(T+1), the bank would be able to borrow 95% of the new market 
value 90, i.e. 85.5. 
One possible reason which could be inhibiting the private sector  8 
from adopting a broader range of collateral has been indicated 
by Ewerhart and Tapking (2008), i.e. the default risk of the 
collateral taker. The “market failure” is due to the following 
reason: for very risky collateral, it would be necessary to apply 
very high haircuts. However, there is also a risk that the cash 
provider may go bankrupt, which prevents the collateral provider 
from using this type of collateral.
According to the latest breakdown in the Securities Industry  9 
and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) report for the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 2008, the average daily volume of total outstanding 
repo contracts totalled USD   7.  06 trillion, with US Treasury 
notes, bonds and bills accounting for in total 81%, followed 
by Federal agencies (  11.  2%), and other (  7.  9%), which includes 
discount agencies, Treasury Inﬂ  ation-Protected  Securities 
(TIPS), and more.10
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have decided to accept a broad range of both 
public and private sector claims as collateral, 
veering closer to the second approach than the ﬁ  rst. 
The explanation for these different approaches 
is that central banks must take into account a 
different range of factors from private institutions. 
In particular, they are concerned to ensure the 
effective implementation of monetary policy 
and, in the case of some central banks, also about 
the smooth functioning of payment systems, 
while taking into account the constraints 
imposed by the external environment (i.e., the 
central bank’s statutory requirements and the 
structure and development of domestic capital 
markets and the local banking sector). Thus, the 
interpretation of “adequacy of collateral” given 
by different central banks depends on the design 
of the operational framework and external factors 
shaping the supply and demand of collateral. 
The choice of collateral is a residual decision 
after the other, arguably more important, 
decisions are made. 
The following subsections distinguish between 
the impact of the external environment and 
internal choices determining the set-up of the 
collateral framework of a central bank. Since 
there are many interdependencies between 
external and internal factors, the distinction is 
stylised and, to a certain extent, artiﬁ  cial. 
2.1 EXTERNAL  ENVIRONMENT
Before making any decisions on how it 
should implement monetary policy, a central 
bank needs to take into account a number 
of possible constraints imposed by its external 
environment: (i) any legal restrictions imposed 
by the central bank’s statute; (ii) the state 
of development and depth of ﬁ  nancial markets; 
and (iii) the structure of banking sector. 
For example, if a country had very limited or 
even non-existent capital markets, it would 
not make sense to have only marketable 
securities as collateral. On similar grounds, 
if the banking sector was highly concentrated, 
a central bank would only need to deal with 
a small range of counterparties.
2.1.1 LEGAL RESTRICTIONS
The legal restrictions under which central banks 
operate under have a direct impact on their 
operational and collateral frameworks. 
In the case of the Eurosystem, there is a legal 
requirement that the central bank cannot 
purchase public sector securities on the primary 
market, although it can do so on the secondary 
market. Similarly, the Eurosystem is forbidden 
from lending directly to public sector institutions. 
Furthermore, in its collateral framework, the 
Eurosystem is also obliged not to treat public 
sector issuers more favourably than private 
sector issuers, except where this is justiﬁ  ed by 
objective considerations, such as levels of credit 
or liquidity risk. These statutory requirements 
make it possible for the Eurosystem to accept a 
wide range of assets, not only in its capacity as 
lender of last resort, but also in the implementation 
of monetary policy.
In the case of the Federal Reserve, lending to 
depository institutions in the capacity of lender 
of last resort and conducting open market 
operations to implement monetary policy are 
viewed as very distinct activities of the central 
bank. They are even governed by different 
bodies: the Board of Governors and the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC), respectively. 
The Federal Reserve Act (FRA) restricts 
discount window lending to banks, except under 
“unusual and exigent conditions”. Under the 
FRA a wide range of collateral is eligible for this 
safety valve purpose. Decisions on the types of 
collateral that are acceptable are at the discretion 
of the Reserve Bank, although in practice these 
policies are coordinated for the entire Federal 
Reserve. By contrast, collateral eligible for 
open market operations is very restricted 
under the FRA: only Treasury, agency, and 
agency mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) are 
accepted. In principle, open market operations 
are open to all types of ﬁ  nancial institutions.
The Bank of England is not constrained by 
any statutory requirements regarding its 
eligible collateral.11
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2   FACTORS  INFLUENCING 
THE COLLATERAL 
FRAMEWORK
2.1.2 STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITAL 
MARKETS 
The state of development of a country’s 
capital markets can have a signiﬁ  cant impact 
on how monetary policy is implemented. 
In order to compensate for the withdrawal 
of liquidity that results mainly from the 
issuance of banknotes in circulation, as well 
as the additional demand for liquidity created 
by required reserves, central banks can provide 
liquidity to the banking sector by means 
of outright or temporary open market 
operations. The central bank’s decision on 
whether to use primarily outright or temporary 
operations depends on whether capital markets 
are deep enough in relation to the liquidity that 
needs to be provided to the banking sector. 
The central bank is only in a position to operate 
a monetary outright portfolio on a permanent 
basis without creating market distortions 
if capital markets are deep enough. 
When the Eurosystem designed its operational 
framework, it needed to take into account the 
diverse national ﬁ   nancial markets at the start 
of 1999. The technical problems arising from 
the lack of a single euro area government 
bond market were one of the reasons why 
the Eurosystem did not establish an outright 
portfolio earmarked for monetary policy 
purposes until the launch of its Covered Bond 
Purchase Programme in July 2009. In the 
absence of a monetary policy outright portfolio, 
the Eurosystem operated with very large 
temporary operations, amounting to €466 billion 
(38% of its balance sheet in July 2007) before 
the onset of the turmoil. 
This had an impact on the collateral policy of 
the Eurosystem. All other things being equal, 
the larger the volume of central bank temporary 
operations relative to the size of the domestic 
government bond market, the greater the need to 
expand the eligibility of collateral to private 
sector securities or non-marketable assets 
(see sub-section 2.2.2). In the United States, the 
ratio of temporary operations to the size of the 
domestic government bond market was, before 
the current crisis, very low at 1:200 due to the 
relatively narrow role for temporary operations 
in the Federal Reserve’s operational framework; 
while for the Eurosystem it was much higher 
at 1:10, and in the case of the Bank of England 
the ratio was even higher at 1:9, indicating that 
these latter two central banks would face greater 
collateral constraints if only domestic 
government bonds were eligible.10
Another factor inﬂ   uencing the Eurosystem 
collateral framework was the fact that it was 
a more traditional bank-based ﬁ  nancial system, 
with relatively undeveloped private sector bond 
markets. The funding of residential mortgages 
in the euro area was and still is predominantly 
done through retail deposits. For example, 
it is estimated  11 that retail deposits accounted 
for approximately 60% of €6.1 trillion 
of outstanding residential mortgage balances 
in the EU 27 in 2007, with only 27% funded 
through mortgage-related securities (16% 
through covered bonds and 11% through 
mortgage-backed securities), with the remainder 
funded through unsecured borrowing. 
Additionally, the corporate bond market in the 
euro area was relatively underdeveloped as 
companies have traditionally obtained ﬁ  nancing 
from banks or by using retained proﬁ  ts rather 
than the capital markets. This prominent role 
of loans in the Eurosystem and the limited scale 
of securitisation of loans to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) was one of the reasons 
why the Eurosystem developed a euro area-wide 
eligibility framework for bank loans, which was 
launched at the start of 2007.12 
All data is from July 2007, prior to the onset of the ﬁ  nancial  10 
turmoil.
See European Mortgage Federation (2007), Hypostat. 11 
Some have argued that by accepting corporate loans as collateral,  12 
the Eurosystem may be hampering the development of SME loan 
securitisation. But it seems more likely that other factors are 
more important in impeding the market, in particular the lack of 
homogeneity of the SME loan market and the lack of balance 
sheet data over the cycle. Furthermore, banks would most likely 
wish to securitise the lower credit quality loans; given that the 
Eurosystem minimum credit threshold is rather high at single A- 
(although reduced to BBB- during the ﬁ  nancial turmoil), banks 
would probably wish to retain these higher quality loans on their 
balance sheet. 12
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In addition to having a more bank-based 
ﬁ   nancial system, the Eurosystem’s collateral 
framework was also inﬂ  uenced by the ongoing 
integration of the euro area ﬁ  nancial markets. 
One of the clearest consequences of this 
environment was the establishment of a two-tier 
collateral framework, with the ﬁ  rst tier based on 
euro area-wide harmonised eligibility criteria 
and the second tier targeted towards the speciﬁ  c 
needs of the national banking sectors. Although 
the level of segmentation in ﬁ  nancial markets 
has subsided signiﬁ  cantly since the launch of 
the euro, leading to the phase-out of the two-tier 
list in 2007, some segments of the market remain 
less than fully integrated and continue to impact 
on the Eurosystem’s collateral policy.13 
In contrast, thanks to the ample supply of 
US Treasury debt (and associated well-developed 
government securities markets), the Federal 
Reserve has faced relatively few constraints 
concerning the design of its operational 
framework. Prior to the onset of the turmoil, the 
Federal Reserve had a very large outright asset 
portfolio, amounting to approximately 91% 
of its balanced sheet, and composed mostly of 
US Treasuries. Temporary operations amounted 
to only USD 23 billion or 3% of its balance sheet 
in July 2007. An important challenge, however, 
did occur in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
when the Federal Reserve considered a range of 
solutions to address expectations of persistent 
US Treasury budgetary surpluses which could 
have led to a scarcity of US Treasury securities. 
The range of solutions included expanding the 
range of assets for its outright operations to 
include non-Treasury securities and modifying 
and expanding its discount window (in a very 
similar way to the Term Auction Facility (TAF) 
that was eventually implemented at the end 
of 2007; see Chapter 3). As a part of this process, 
the Federal Reserve also assessed whether these 
changes to its operational framework would still 
comply with its core principles, in particular the 
effective implementation of monetary policy 
and the desire to minimise the impact on market 
prices. Ultimately, the surpluses turned into 
deﬁ  cits and the concerns over the scarcity of 
US Treasury securities disappeared; therefore 
no measures were implemented by the Federal 
Reserve at the time. 
In the case of the Bank of England, the relatively 
high ratio between the size of temporary 
operations and the domestic government bond 
market may have played a role in its decision in 
the early 2000s to expand eligible collateral to 
cover all euro area government bonds above a 
certain rating threshold. This allowed the Bank 
to expand signiﬁ  cantly the amount of eligible 
collateral, while still restricting itself to high 
quality government bonds.
2.1.3 BANKING STRUCTURE AND ACCESS 
BY COUNTERPARTIES
A second important aspect of the central 
bank’s environment that affects the design 
of the collateral framework is the choice of 
counterparties that may participate in the 
various central bank operations. This is because, 
all else being equal, the wider the range of 
counterparties, the more diverse the types of 
collateral asset held on their balance sheets are 
likely to be. If the central bank wants to ensure 
that this broad range of counterparties is able 
to participate on an approximately equal basis, 
then it also needs to accept a broad range of 
collateral.
This is certainly the case in the euro area. 
The Eurosystem has always placed a strong 
emphasis on ensuring that a broad range 
of counterparties can access central bank 
operations for two reasons. First, in order to 
ensure a level playing ﬁ  eld, it is necessary to take 
account of the difference in countries’ banking 
structure. Specialised banks, in particular, 
still play an important role in many euro area 
countries, which adds to the heterogeneity 
At the same time, the Eurosystem’s collateral framework has also  13 
had some positive effects in terms of fostering the integration 
of  ﬁ   nancial markets. For example, through the establishment 
of the Correspondent Central Banking Model (CCBM), 
the Eurosystem has facilitated the use of collateral on a cross-
border basis in credit operations with the Eurosystem, thereby 
providing an additional incentive for counterparties to diversify 
their portfolios across assets in different countries. As a result, 
the use of collateral on a cross-border basis in credit operations 
with the Eurosystem increased from 12% in 1999 to more than 
50% by 2006.13
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of the asset composition on banks’ balance 
sheets. Second, on a more practical level, 
there is still much more room for national and 
especially cross-border banking consolidation, 
and with few, if any, fully European banks, 
it is difﬁ   cult to make a selection of only a 
small number of counterparties. In order to 
achieve a broad participation, the Eurosystem 
allows all credit institutions subject to 
minimum reserve requirements to participate 
in the main temporary operations, provided 
they are deemed ﬁ  nancially sound by national 
supervisors and meet some basic operational 
requirements. Those requirements do not 
require active participation in private repo 
markets, as the Eurosystem operates temporary 
operations that are particularly designed 
for monetary policy purposes. Currently, 
this means that about 1,700 institutions 
are eligible to participate in regular open 
market operations (i.e. around 30% of all 
credit institutions). Typically, the number of 
participating institutions has ﬂ  uctuated between 
300 to 400 (338 on average during 2007),
but this number increased during the period of 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil, averaging 443 during 2008 
and 747 since the policy shift to the ﬁ  xed rate 
full allotment tenders in October 2008. 
In contrast, in line with the provisions under the 
FRA, the Federal Reserve distinguishes between 
depository institutions (banks) that have access 
to primary credit (discount window) lending, 
and counterparties that are eligible for its open 
market operations. All 7,000 depository 
institutions that have a reserve account with the 
Federal Reserve and an adequate supervisory 
rating have access to the discount window 
against a very broad range of collateral.14 
However, lending to banks through the discount 
window has historically not been a regular part 
of managing the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet 
and the discount window has largely served the 
function of “lender of last resort”.
In principle, the Federal reserve’s open market 
operations are open to all types of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions in principle. However, given the 
narrow role of temporary operations and the 
fact that the Federal Reserve operates directly in 
the private repo market for collateral accepted 
under the FRA, the Federal Reserve has 
traditionally relied on a small group of primary 
dealers (currently 18) for this purpose. The 
main restriction for these counterparties is that 
they must be active in government and agency 
securities markets in which the open market 
operations are arranged. The primary dealers 
serve as the medium for making adjustments 
to the aggregate stock of reserve balances, and 
the redistribution of these balances occurs in the 
federal funds market. 
Similar to the Federal Reserve, the Bank of 
England limited participation in its open market 
operations to a small sub-set of its largest 
clearing banks (around ﬁ  ve  institutions) 
until 2006, when a major reform of its operational 
framework took place. This reform introduced 
a system of voluntary reserve requirements 
and widened the range of counterparties. 
The Bank of England does not publish the 
names of the institutions that are eligible to 
participate in its operations, but it is likely to be 
broader than the Federal Reserve yet narrower 
than the Eurosystem (i.e. between 5% and 10% 
of the 400 resident banks).
2.2 INTERNAL  CHOICES
While the external environment is a given for 
the central bank, there are other aspects in the 
design of the operational framework which can 
then inﬂ  uence the choice of collateral: (i) the 
central bank’s guiding principles; (ii) the size 
and composition of the central bank’s balance 
sheet; and (iii) whether collateral eligibility is 
differentiated according to the type of operation. 
This section analyses these factors. 
There are also differences in the way in which central  14 
banks assess the ﬁ   nancial soundness of their counterparties. 
Because of its additional role as a banking supervisor, the 
Federal Reserve has access to internal supervisory ratings 
which help it to distinguish between the banks eligible for the 
primary and secondary credit facilities. The ECB, on the other 
hand, does not supervise banks and, depending on the local 
set-up, this task is carried out either by the national central 
bank (NCB) or by an independent national supervisory agency 
(or a combination of both).14
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2.2.1 THE CENTRAL BANK’S GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Central banks implicitly or sometimes explicitly 
design their operational frameworks on a 
number of principles (see Box 1). While there 
are a number of common principles between the 
three central banks, in particular the desire to 
have balance sheet ﬂ  exibility and/or sufﬁ  ciency 
of collateral to be able to achieve monetary 
policy, payment system, and even ﬁ  nancial 
stability objectives, there are some differences 
that may have also had an impact on the design 
of the collateral framework.
Box 1
PRINCIPLES OF CENTRAL BANK OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORKS
In the case of the Eurosystem,1 the key principles have not been stated explicitly, but can be 
derived mostly from the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Protocol on the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank: 
Collateral must protect the Eurosystem from incurring losses in its credit operations.   –
The volume of collateral available to counterparties must ensure that the Eurosystem can    –
effectively conduct monetary policy operations and promote the smooth operation of the 
payment system.
Eurosystem operations should be equally accessible to a broad set of counterparties.   –
Eligible collateral should offer cost-efﬁ  cient transfer and mobilisation conditions, credit risk    –
evaluation and monitoring possibilities.
The Eurosystem must act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with    –
free competition, favouring an efﬁ  cient allocation of resources.
The collateral framework should be simple and transparent.   –
There should be no special or privileged treatment of public sector securities.   –
The Federal Reserve  2 has outlined four principles for managing its assets:
The Federal Reserve must have effective control over the stock of high-powered money and    –
the size of its balance sheet.
The Federal Reserve should structure its portfolio and undertake its activities so as to    –
minimise their effect on relative asset values and credit allocation within the private sector.
The Federal Reserve should manage its portfolio to minimise risks in a manner consistent    –
with the achievement of its goals and to maintain sufﬁ  cient liquidity to be able to conduct 
potentially large actions at short notice.
The Federal Reserve should place a high priority on transparency and accountability.   –
For the Bank of England,3 market operations have two core objectives, stemming from its 
monetary policy and ﬁ  nancial stability responsibilities, as well as two other considerations:
To implement monetary policy by maintaining overnight market interest rates in line with    –
Bank Rate, so that there is a ﬂ  at risk-free money market yield curve to the next Monetary 
Policy Committee decision date, and there is very little day-to-day or intraday volatility in 
market interest rates at maturities out to that horizon.
1   See Box 1 in European Central Bank (2008b).
2   See Federal Reserve Board (2002).
3   See Chapter II of Bank of England (2008b).15
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One of the more notable differences concerns 
the preference for market neutrality, i.e. to 
desire to minimise the effect of operations on 
relative asset prices or the allocation of credit. 
Generally, temporary repo operations have a 
much lower impact on asset prices than outright 
purchases because the credit and market risk 
of the collateral remains with the counterparty. 
Nevertheless, an impact on asset prices cannot 
be entirely excluded: by granting collateral 
eligibility to an asset, a central bank may 
increase the liquidity of the asset, raising its 
value in the secondary market relative to assets 
that are not eligible. This, in turn, could enhance 
the ability of issuers to obtain credit from the 
private sector for this asset relative to assets that 
are not eligible.
Prior to the ﬁ   nancial turmoil, the Federal 
Reserve maintained a strong focus on market 
neutrality in the conduct of its open market 
operations. It had this ability since the type of 
securities permitted by the FRA in open market 
operations – US Treasury securities, along with 
agencies and agency MBSs – are characterised 
by relative safety, credit neutrality, and ample 
supply. Prior to the turmoil, the Federal Reserve 
held a large volume of US Treasury securities in 
its outright portfolio. Due to the breadth and 
depth of the US Treasury market, the Federal 
Reserve was able to conduct outright operations 
with minimal distortions to prices.15 This 
preference for market neutrality has also carried 
over to the temporary open market operations 
that are conducted in different tranches, 
depending on the type of collateral submitted, 
i.e. Treasuries, agencies, and agency MBSs, 
with stop-out rates determined by the market 
repo rates for the different collateral. In a sense, 
the Federal Reserve operated in these markets 
as if it was just another “market player”, 
albeit a very large and important one, adopting 
the same instruments, market conventions, 
collateral requirements, risk management 
practices, and so on. 
This focus on market neutrality can also be 
seen in early 2000, when the Federal Reserve 
introduced limits on the volume of individual 
Treasury securities that it could purchase for 
its outright portfolio amidst concerns about 
the shrinking supply of government securities. 
The limits were intended to help avoid creating 
supply constraints along the yield curve. 
Similarly, the Bank of England has also 
maintained a focus on market neutrality. 
The main temporary open market operations 
have traditionally been conducted in a single-
tranche auction in which eligible collateral for 
the operation is limited to only government or 
quasi-government bonds. 
In contrast, the Eurosystem has prioritised the 
sufﬁ  cient availability of collateral and a level 
playing  ﬁ   eld across counterparties. Given 
signiﬁ   cant fragmentation of capital markets 
in the euro area and the lack of consolidation 
of the banking sector (on both a national and 
cross-border level), it has focused its attention 
on ensuring a low cost and abundance of 
In managing the portfolio, the Federal Reserve has avoided  15 
purchases on days of high market volatility and has avoided 
purchasing securities that were in high demand. Moreover, the 
Federal Reserve has made its portfolio of securities available to 
the market through its securities lending operations. 
To reduce the cost of disruptions to the liquidity and payments services supplied by    –
commercial banks. The Bank does this by balancing the provision of liquidity insurance 
against the costs of creating incentives for banks to take greater risks, and subject to the need 
to avoid taking risk onto its balance sheet.
For market operations to have broadly neutral effects on relative asset prices, in normal    –
circumstances.
To foster competitive and fair sterling money markets.   –16
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collateral for counterparties. It has adopted a 
policy of pooled collateral for all different types 
of operations, with no price discrimination. 
In doing so, the Eurosystem has accepted that 
its operations could potentially have an effect 
on market equilibria. However, the lack of 
consolidation in the banking sector and the 
fragmentation of capital markets would have 
hampered efforts to be market neutral like the 
Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. 
2.2.2 CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEET SIZE 
AND COMPOSITION
As indicated in sub-section 2.1.1, the central 
bank’s decision on whether primarily to use 
outright or credit operations can have a critical 
impact on the collateral policy. To illustrate 
this, Table 1a shows a stylised balance sheet 
of a central bank that mainly provides liquidity 
through outright operations. In this case, 
the balance sheet size is 100, equivalent to the 
volume of banknotes in circulation, while on 
the asset side 75 is composed of a portfolio of 
government bonds which have been purchased 
outright, while 25 is composed of credit 
operations (i.e. also assumed to be collateralised 
only against government bonds). 
Assume that the outstanding amount of 
government bonds is 200 and that these can 
either be owned by the central bank, the banking 
sector or investment funds. Given that 75 of 
the government bonds is held by the central 
bank, the remaining 125 is held by the banking 
and investment fund sectors. Assume that, for 
precautionary reasons, banks prefer to hold twice 
the amount of collateral which they strictly need 
for the credit operations, i.e. 50 of government 
bonds. It is well known that banks prefer to 
hold substantial buffers of unused collateral in 
case other forms of short-term market or retail 
funding disappear during market turbulence. 
Banks therefore demand 40% of the residual 
125 government bonds available in the market, 
leaving 75, i.e. 60%, for the investment funds 
(see Table 1b).
In the reverse case of a central bank which 
mainly provides liquidity through credit 
operations, the size of the credit operations 
would be correspondingly higher at 75 and 
only 25 of the government bonds would be held 
in an outright portfolio (see Table 2a). 175 of 
government bonds would be held together by 
the banking and investment fund sector; banks 
would need to hold 150 (or 86%) of the 175 
remaining government bonds, leaving only 
25 or 14% for investment funds (see Table 2b). 
In the latter case, there are more likely to be 
collateral constraints because banks need to hold 
a much larger part of the whole government 
bond market and have to compete more strongly 
with the investment fund sector (potentially 
bidding up the prices of the bonds and making it 
more costly for the banks to hold the collateral). 
Table 1a Central bank balance where 
liquidity mainly provided through outright 
operations
Assets Liabilities
Outright asset portfolio = 75
Banknotes = 100
Credit operations = 25
Table 1b Holdings of central government 




Table 2a Central bank balance where 
liquidity mainly provided through 
temporary operations
Assets Liabilities
Outright asset portfolio = 25
Banknotes = 100
Credit operations = 75
Table 2b Holdings of central government 
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Furthermore, assume that, in a time of market 
turbulence, there would be a further upward 
shift in the precautionary demand for collateral 
(e.g. to three times the volume of temporary 
operations); in this case, there would not be 
enough government bonds available to banks, 
even assuming that the investment funds were 
willing to sell their remaining 14% of the bonds. 
This simple example shows how the size of the 
central bank’s credit operations relative to the 
outright portfolio has a leverage effect on the 
demand for collateral, which is further ampliﬁ  ed 
by banks’ precautionary demand for collateral. 
Therefore, it can be hypothesised that, ceteris 
paribus, the smaller the size of the outright 
portfolio (and greater size of the temporary 
operations), the greater should be the size of the 
collateral pool to avoid the risks of shortages 
of collateral (in normal times and especially in 
times of crisis) and the bidding up of prices of the 
eligible bonds. If the government bond market is 
not sufﬁ  ciently large, then the central bank needs 
to extend eligibility to a broader range of assets.
This has been the case for the Eurosystem, 
which, in the absence of an outright portfolio for 
monetary policy purposes, has had to operate 
with very large temporary operations, amounting 
to €466 billion, or 38% of its balance sheet, as 
of July 2007. This was another driving factor for 
accepting a broad range of collateral. 
In contrast, the Federal Reserve, because of 
the statutory restrictions under the FRA but 
also due to the availability of a large supply of 
Treasury debt that was seen as having attractive 
characteristics for holding in an outright 
portfolio and on a permanent basis, was able 
to implement monetary policy with very small 
temporary operations. Historically temporary 
operations had largely been relegated to the role 
of ﬁ  ne-tuning the level of reserve supply. They 
amounted to only USD 23 billion or 3% of the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet as of July 2007. 
The Bank of England has an outright portfolio 
which aims to mirror to some extent the 
permanent structural development of banknotes 
in circulation. However, this outright portfolio 
remains relatively small (less than GBP 
10 billion prior to the turmoil and an incremental 
increase since then), covering on average less 
than a quarter of the issuance of banknotes. 
This compares with the Federal Reserve, which 
covered almost all of the issuance of banknotes 
with its outright portfolio prior to the turmoil. 
The small size of the Bank of England’s outright 
portfolio means that it still needs to conduct a 
relatively large volume of repo operations. This 
may explain why it expanded eligibility to euro 
area government bonds in addition to domestic 
government bonds.
In addition to composition, the demand for 
collateral is also inﬂ  uenced by the overall size 
of the central bank’s balance sheet. The level 
of reserve requirements factors in the size of 
the balance sheet and the demand for collateral. 
In this vein, the Federal Reserve also has a 
much lower level of reserve requirements 
(USD 14 billion on average during 2007), 
compared with both the Bank of England 
(GBP 20 billion of voluntary reserves) and in 
particular the Eurosystem (€187 billion). 
2.2.3 DIFFERENTIATING OPEN MARKET 
OPERATIONS FROM OTHER OPERATIONS 
Another key choice by the central bank which 
affects collateral policy is whether it accepts the 
same type of collateral for its main temporary 
policy operations as for the standing facility and 
intraday credit (assuming intraday credit has 
to be collateralised). Credit risk in temporary 
operations increases with the maturity of the 
operations, so there is potentially a justiﬁ  cation 
for a central bank to have a more restrictive list 
of eligible collateral for the main temporary 
operations (which may have a maturity from 
several days to several months or even longer) 
than for the standing facility or intraday credit 
(which have a maturity of one day or less). 
Furthermore, as the standing lending facility 
plays the role of an emergency source of 
liquidity when all other sources from the market 
are not available, it is natural that the range of 
eligible collateral should be broader than for the 
temporary operations.18
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Most large central banks, including the 
Eurosystem and Bank of England, maintain the 
same list of eligible collateral for temporary 
open market operations, the marginal lending 
facility and intraday credit, for reasons of 
operational efﬁ   ciency. However, the Federal 
Reserve has a separate, more restrictive, list of 
eligible collateral for open market operations 
from that for discount window lending and 
intraday credit. 
A single list of eligible collateral for all 
temporary operations can have the advantage 
that counterparties can pre-deposit a large 
pool of collateral at the central bank, which 
can then be used by the central bank to make 
loans to counterparties (at any maturity from 
intraday to several months) with same day 
settlement of the operation. An example of 
this operational efﬁ  ciency can be seen in the 
case of intraday credit and the standing facility. 
Assume a counterparty borrows on an intraday 
basis from the central bank and, at the end of 
the day, ﬁ  nds that it cannot repay, for whatever 
reason. If the same collateral is eligible for 
the standing facility as for intraday credit, 
it is very straightforward for the central bank 
to extend the maturity of the loan overnight 
(at a penalty rate). If different collateral lists 
were maintained, and the collateral used for 
intraday credit was not eligible for the standing 
facility, the counterparty would need to ﬁ  nd the 
required securities at short notice.
Having a single list of collateral for all operations 
(both monetary policy and payment system) can 
have a signiﬁ  cant impact on collateral policy, 
primarily because payment system operations 
are generally large in size. Lending granted 
through intraday credit operations equate to 
more than 10% of the central bank’s balance 
sheet for the Federal Reserve and Eurosystem, 
and almost 50% for the Bank of England. The 
large size of intraday credit operations increases 
the demand for collateral signiﬁ  cantly as banks 
may require a large precautionary buffer of 
collateral to guard against unexpected large 
intraday payments ﬂ  ows. Furthermore, a central 
bank will normally prefer to have the broadest 
possible criteria for intraday credit in order to 
ensure that the payment system functions as 
smoothly as possible. 
This impact is greatest in the case of the 
Eurosystem, where the central bank has chosen 
to maintain a very large pool of collateral 
available for intraday credit as well as a single 
list of collateral for all operations. In the case 
of the Federal Reserve, the central bank chooses 
not to collaterise intraday credit up to certain 
limits, instead monitoring counterparty credit 
risk using its own internal ratings. This, in 
conjunction with maintaining a differentiated 
collateral list for operations, supports a narrower 
collateral policy by substantially reducing the 
demand for collateral for temporary operations. 
2.3  OVERALL IMPACT ON THE DESIGN OF THE 
COLLATERAL FRAMEWORK
All of the aforementioned internal and external 
factors have consistently worked in favour of a 
broad and ﬂ  exible collateral framework in the 
case of the Eurosystem even before the current 
crisis, but in favour of a narrower framework 
in the case of the Federal Reserve and also to 
some extent the Bank of England. 
To facilitate the implementation of its broad 
collateral framework, the Eurosystem deﬁ  nes a 
set of general eligibility criteria, rather than 
asset or issuer-speciﬁ  c criteria. The main criteria 
that applied for marketable debt securities, prior 
to the ﬁ  nancial turmoil, were as follows:  16
denominated in euro;   •
minimum credit rating of single A- from one    •
credit rating agency;
issued in the European Economic Area    •
(EEA) and settled in the euro area with a 
Some of these criteria have been temporarily relaxed during  16 
the crisis, e.g. the minimum credit rating was reduced to BBB, 
the eligible currencies were extended to the US dollar, yen 
and pound sterling, and uncovered bank bonds traded on 
non-regulated markets were permitted (for more details, 
see Chapter 3).19
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Central Securities Depository fulﬁ  lling the 
Eurosystem’s minimum standards;
issued by a entity resident in the EEA or non-   •
EEA Group of Ten (G10) countries; and
traded on a regulated or certain acceptable    •
non-regulated markets.
Under this set of criteria, all types of debt 
instruments are potentially eligible, including 
not only government bonds, but also corporate 
bonds, uncovered bank bonds, covered bonds and 
asset-backed securities. Non-marketable assets, 
such as loans to non-ﬁ  nancial corporations or the 
public sector may also be accepted as collateral. 
All assets must also fulﬁ  l certain requirements, 
such as being denominated in euro and having 
a minimum credit threshold. In 2007, the total 
amount of eligible marketable securities averaged 
€9.5 trillion. The average reached  €11.1 trillion 
in 2008 with the temporary relaxation of some 
of the eligibility criteria. The volume of eligible 
non-marketable assets is currently estimated to 
be upwards of €0.5 trillion. 
In contrast, the Federal Reserve maintains a 
issuer-speciﬁ  c approach in which it accepts only 
three types of securities in its temporary 
operations: securities issued by the central 
government, Federal agencies and MBSs 
guaranteed by the Federal agencies. In total, this 
amounted to approximately USD 13.5 trillion of 
eligible collateral at the end of 2008.17 
Similar to the Federal Reserve, the Bank of 
England has also adopted an issuer speciﬁ  c 
approach and, prior to the crisis, accepted only 
EEA government securities rated double-A or 
above, US Treasuries, and other AAA-rated 
international  ﬁ   nancial institutions, in both its 
open market operations and standing facilities. 
However, since October 2008, it has reformed 
its eligibility criteria, permanently expanding 
the range of collateral in three-month long-term 
repo operations and also in its new discount 
window facility.
A comparison of the eligibility criteria of the 
three central banks before the ﬁ  nancial turmoil 
is provided in Table 3. 
This  ﬁ   gure is higher than what is available in practice as  17 
it includes the portion that is held in the Federal Reserve’s 
permanent portfolio.20
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agency stocks only
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backed securities 
require AAA rating 
at issuance
Minimum rating 
of AA from at least 
two rating agencies
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Foreign - √ Euroclear, 
Clearstream 
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3  THE IMPACT OF THE COLLATERAL 
FRAMEWORKS ON CENTRAL BANKS’ 
RESPONSES TO THE TURMOIL 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the 
collateral frameworks of the central banks under 
review had been primarily designed in such a 
way as to protect them against incurring ﬁ  nancial 
losses and to facilitate the smooth operation of 
monetary policy and payment system transactions. 
That the design of a collateral framework could 
also play a role in fostering the resilience of the 
ﬁ  nancial system in times of market distress was 
probably not actively considered. However, 
the recent ﬁ   nancial turmoil has brought the 
interaction between central banks’ collateral 
framework, the behaviour of counterparties 
and secured funding markets to the fore, with 
structural changes in ﬁ   nancing the cause of 
this heightened interaction. The trend among 
major global banks had been towards greater 
reliance on wholesale market sources of funding. 
Instead of relying on retail deposits, banks were 
increasingly relying on interbank borrowing, 
both unsecured and collateralised, issuance of 
short and long-term debt, and securitisation. 
This is evidenced by the increasing “customer 
funding gap” of the major banks – i.e. shortfall 
in customer deposits relative to customer lending 
and hence the amount of loans that needed to be 
ﬁ  nanced in the wholesale markets (see Chart 1 
for the UK). This “funding gap” had increased 
signiﬁ  cantly before the turmoil and had been met 
increasingly by funding from securitisation.
This trend towards wholesale funding made 
access to liquidity more dependent on 
market conditions. As the turmoil has clearly 
demonstrated, sudden disruptions in market 
liquidity can easily cause funding liquidity 
problems, leading to uncertainty about bank 
resilience and thus triggering a vicious circle. 
This was certainly the case for the UK mortgage 
bank, Northern Rock, which had based its 
business model primarily on wholesale funding 
through the issuance of asset-backed securities. 
Compared with other commercial banks and 
mortgage banks in the UK, the share of its 
liabilities comprised by deposits was the one 
of the lowest. Northern Rock was therefore 
particularly vulnerable to the abrupt closure of 
asset-backed securities markets in the autumn 
of 2007, forcing it to seek emergency liquidity 
assistance from the Bank of England.
At the same time, the trend towards wholesale 
funding meant that the range of systemically 
relevant institutions had also become broader. 
Due to the increasing reliance on wholesale 
funding via both secured and unsecured markets, 
as opposed to the traditional deposit funding, 
not only traditional commercial banks but 
increasingly also investment banks that did not 
take deposits acquired systemic implications. 
In the traditional banking crisis literature, the 
focus has been on the systemic implications of a 
deposit run.18 However, the recent “wholesale 
funding run” in both secured and unsecured 
markets in the case of Bear Stearns, showed that 
highly interconnected investment banks in their 
crucial broker-dealer function play a systemic 
role too (see Box 2 on the interaction between 
funding and market liquidity). Such banks 
perform a key role in maintaining market 
liquidity in a broad range of unsecured and 
secured markets. If they face funding liquidity 
constraints, market liquidity will be widely 
affected, with potential negative repercussions 
for the banking sector. 
See Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 18 
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Source: Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report, April 2008.22
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Box 2
FUNDING AND MARKET LIQUIDITY – DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS AND INTERACTION
The term “liquidity” has two dimensions. It can be “institution-speciﬁ  c”, or it can be “asset-speciﬁ  c”. 
“Funding liquidity” is institution-speciﬁ  c: it relates to the balance sheet of an individual institution. 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), funding liquidity is the 
ability to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due.1 Funding liquidity risk, 
is “the risk that a ﬁ  rm, although balance-sheet solvent, cannot maintain or generate sufﬁ  cient cash 
resources to meet its payment obligations in full as they fall due, or can only do so at materially 
disadvantageous terms”.2 Taking into account the increased reliance on secured funding, this 
relates not only to the ability efﬁ  ciently to meet both expected and unexpected current and future 
cash ﬂ  ows, but also to meet collateral needs.3 
Market liquidity is deﬁ  ned as “the ease with which one can liquidate a position in an asset 
without appreciably altering its price”.4 The correspondent risk can be deﬁ  ned as not being able 
to immediately liquidate or hedge a position at current market prices.5
The ﬁ  nancial crisis has shown that ﬁ  nancial intermediaries other than banks play a crucial 
role in maintaining market liquidity, and that market liquidity will be widely affected if such 
intermediaries face funding liquidity constraints. For example, as long as hedge funds, which 
might be willing to take advantage of any distortions in structured ﬁ  nance markets, are constrained 
in their investing activity because prime brokers have tightened credit availability to them, it is 
unlikely that structured ﬁ  nance markets will reopen. Brunnermeier and Pedersen acknowledge the 
crucial role that the market-making sector – e.g. a dealer, a hedge fund, or an investment bank – 
can play in maintaining market liquidity.6 Their model shows how the funding of trades affects, 
and is affected by, market liquidity in a profound way due to destabilising collateral margin 
requirements or loss spirals that erode dealers’ capital. The authors consider a simple model with 
trade in one security. There are three types of agents in the model. At time 1, the initial customer 
enters one side of the market (buy/sell), and, at time 2, the complementary customer enters the 
opposite side of the market (sell/buy). Dealers provide immediacy by always being willing to 
trade in any side of the market. They ﬁ  nance their securities positions via collateralised funding. 
Since, when they buy a security, they cannot borrow the entire price of the security by using it 
as collateral, due to the margin required by the lender, they need capital for trading. Hence, they 
face a capital constraint, determined by the margin, i.e. the difference between the security’s 
price and its collateral value, which is in turn a function of the asset’s fundamental volatility and 
of the market liquidity. The problem is that higher margins erode the dealers’ capital so that they 
become more reluctant to trade with buy side ﬁ  rms. This in turn means that assets become less 
liquid, i.e. market liquidity decreases. And this means that margins increase further, tightening 
dealers’ funding constraint further, and so on. Another liquidity spiral may emerge if dealers 
hold a large initial position that suffers a loss due to a negative demand shock. This can lead to a 
funding shock, forcing dealers to sell more, causing a further price drop, and so on.
1  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008).
2  Financial Services Authority (2007).
3  See the deﬁ  nition of liquidity risk by the Institute of International Finance (2007).
4  See, for example, International Monetary Fund (2008), Chapter 3. 
5  See, for example, Bervas (2006).
6  See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008).23
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This heightened interaction between market and 
funding liquidity risk has implications for the 
implementation of monetary policy. In order to 
stem a breakdown in ﬁ  nancial market functioning, 
including a sudden loss of substantial amounts of 
secured ﬁ  nancing, central banks have needed to 
ﬁ  nd ways to extend liquidity assistance to asset 
markets and to relieve funding pressures not 
only for banks, but also for other systemically 
relevant ﬁ  nancial institutions. Access to a central 
bank’s collateralised lending facilities against a 
broad range of collateral can play an important 
role in this respect. The policy responses of 
the Eurosystem, Federal Reserve, and Bank of 
England during the turmoil are described in the 
following subsections.
3.1 EUROSYSTEM
As described earlier, the Eurosystem’s 
operational and collateral framework prior to the 
crisis had a certain degree of inherent ﬂ  exibility 
due to the need to cope with less developed 
capital markets. This meant that, despite the 
absence of a centralised ﬁ   scal authority, the 
Eurosystem did not initially have to adjust its 
framework to prevent an immediate meltdown 
of the ﬁ  nancial system. There are three elements 
to this ﬂ  exibility, as set out below.
Firstly, a wide range of institutions, small 
savings banks and co-operative banks, as well 
as investment banks with a limited deposit 
base, can access central bank liquidity directly. 
This feature allowed the Eurosystem to mitigate 
the funding liquidity risks more directly for a 
broader range of counterparties when short-term 
interbank markets stopped functioning properly. 
Secondly, the fact that the Eurosystem accepts 
a wide range of collateral in all types of credit 
operations meant that collateral has not been 
a constraint, at the aggregate level or at the 
level of individual counterparties. Moreover, 
counterparties had leeway to adjust the collateral 
brought forward to the central bank, in line with 
opportunity cost considerations. Developments 
in the use of collateral after the outbreak of the 
turmoil show that counterparties made active 
use of this leeway. They have economised, in 
particular, on the use of central government 
bonds, which has often been almost the only 
collateral counterparties could still use in 
interbank repo markets. By the end of 2008, €193 
billion of central government bonds (equivalent 
to only 9% of total collateral which stood at 
€2.1 trillion) were pledged as collateral for 
Eurosystem credit operations. Thus, only 4% of 
the €4.1 trillion stock of government bonds was 
being tied up in Eurosystem credit operations, 
leaving the remainder to be used in private repo 
markets. The proportion of central government 
bonds in the total collateral used in Eurosystem 
credit operations had been on a declining trend 
for several years, decreasing from 21% in 2006 
and 47% at the start of monetary union in 1999. 
At the same time, banks have increasingly 
brought forward less liquid collateral for which 
primary and secondary markets have nearly 
entirely dried up. Most notably, the annual 
average share of asset-backed securities (ABSs) 
pledged as collateral with the Eurosystem 
rose to 28% during 2008 (or €521 billion), 
up from 11% in 2006 and only 6% in 2004 
(see Chart 2). 
Finally, because the Eurosystem provides the 
bulk of its reﬁ   nancing via temporary open 
market operations, these operations have also 
been large in scale relative to outstanding 
volumes in a number of market segments. 
For example, the size of temporary operations 
was more than €800 billion by the end of 2008, 
which was larger than the entire euro corporate 
bond market or equivalent to almost 50% of 
the entire outstanding European ABS market. 
The scale of the Eurosystem’s operations has 
allowed for a large portion of these assets to be 
ﬁ  nanced through the central bank. 
These three features, in combination with a 
lengthening of the maturity proﬁ  le in the regular 
repo operations, allowed the Eurosystem to 
provide liquidity assistance not only to banks 
but also indirectly to asset markets. As a result, 
the Eurosystem did not need to make many 
changes to its operational framework during the 
ﬁ  rst year of the turmoil. 24
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This ability to provide indirect assistance to 
asset markets was most apparent in the ABS 
market. It is largely due to the Eurosystem’s 
collateral framework that euro-denominated 
securitisation issuance did not come to a halt, 
even though the vast majority of transactions 
were retained on banks’ balance sheets to be 
used in central bank credit operations. While 
issuance of “private label”  19 MBSs in the US 
declined signiﬁ  cantly from USD 580.8 billion 
in 2007 to only USD 39.9 billion in 2008, in 
the euro area issuance actually increased from 
€212.2 billion in the ﬁ  rst three quarters of 2007 
to €278.2 billion in the same period of 2008. 
Speciﬁ   cally, the Eurosystem accepts only 
ABSs that are based on true sale and are 
bankruptcy-remote from the originator. 
Because these requirements should in principle 
ensure remoteness between the issuer and the 
originator, the Eurosystem allows 
counterparties use ABSs that they have 
originated themselves and retained on their 
balance sheet (so-called “own use”) and 
counterparties have made active use of this 
possibility. However, as long as the Eurosystem 
applied variable rate tenders in its temporary 
operations, this did not imply that the 
Eurosystem reﬁ   nanced the ABSs on one-to-
one basis. Eurosystem NCBs generally operate 
so-called “pooling systems” which allow 
counterparties to predeposit more collateral 
than they actually need.20 Indeed, these 
precautionary collateral buffers increased 
signiﬁ  cantly during the turmoil, resulting in a 
large degree of over-collateralisation in the 
system.21 Nonetheless, the ability to use ABSs 
as collateral with the Eurosystem has helped 
counterparties to hedge the asset reﬁ  nancing 
risk of those instruments and possibly 
prevented ﬁ  re sales even before the switch to 
ﬁ   xed-rate full allotment tender procedures 
(see below). 
“Private-label” MBSs refer to those securities issued by private- 19 
sector entities. There are also large volumes of MBSs issued by 
the US government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), such as Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae, which are instead called “agency MBSs”.
A “pooling” collateral system creates a pledge (or security  20 
interest) over a commercial bank’s securities in favour of the 
central bank but, unlike a repo transaction, leaves ownership of 
the assets with the commercial banks. The pooling/pledge method 
of collateralisation is highly ﬂ  exible as all assets in the bank’s 
collateral pool are treated as fungible, and unlike the “repo” 
method it enables commercial banks to pledge more assets than 
they need to cover their borrowing. In repos, it is necessary to 
specify exactly which securities are being used as collateral for 
a loan from the central bank and “overcollateralisation” can be 
more complicated to organise.
Even during the period of ﬁ  xed-rate full allotments, when banks  21 
were given the opportunity to reﬁ  nance all eligible collateral, 
including ABSs, levels of overcollateralisation still remained 
very high, at around 50%. There were several reasons for the 
very high level of overcollateralisation. First, the opportunity 
cost of keeping the collateral, such as ABSs, at the central bank 
are extremely low or even zero (i.e. there are no alternative uses: 
the assets would otherwise have been idle on the banks’ balance 
sheets). Second, banks prefer to have high precautionary buffers 
so that it is very quick and easy to increase borrowing levels 
in the event of abrupt changes in liquidity needs (e.g. due to 
negative publicity about the bank’s credit standing).
Chart 2 Volume of collateral pledged with 
the Eurosystem and composition of collateral
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Following Lehman Brothers ﬁ  ling  for 
bankruptcy in September 2008, there was a 
dramatic increase in the level of dysfunction of 
the euro area money market, which eventually 
required the Eurosystem temporarily to modify 
its operational framework quite signiﬁ  cantly. 
There were two main changes. First, starting in 
mid-October 2008, the Eurosystem took the 
unprecedented step of applying a ﬁ  xed-rate full 
allotment tender procedure in all reﬁ  nancing 
operations (the normal one-week 
main reﬁ  nancing operations – MROs – and the 
long-term reﬁ  nancing operations – LTROs) of 
three and six months, as well as all US dollar 
operations). Through this measure, the 
Eurosystem in effect took over the intermediation 
function of money markets. It removed the 
uncertainty for banks about their ability to 
ﬁ  nance themselves over a horizon of up to one 
year. Second, in order to facilitate the full 
allotment policy and further increase the already 
very broad range of eligible assets on banks’ 
balance sheets, the Eurosystem decided 
temporarily to expand the list of collateral until 
the end of 2009.22 
In parallel, the Eurosystem has undertaken intense 
work to counteract increased liquidation and 
concentration risks accumulating in its temporary 
operations by means of improved risk control 
measures. On 4 September 2008, the liquidity 
categories were technically reﬁ  ned,  introducing 
higher haircuts for uncovered bank bonds and 
ABSs. At the same time, concentration risk 
for ABSs was limited by partially restricting 
close links between the issuer and the currency 
hedge or liquidity provider. Transparency for 
the assessment of ABSs was enhanced by the 
introduction of a requirement of publication 
of regular surveillance reports by rating 
agencies. All measures entered into force on 
1 February 2009.
In May 2009, the Eurosystem went a step 
beyond trying to alleviate strains in wholesale 
interbank markets via temporary operations 
when it announced its aim to help directly 
improve the function and liquidity of the covered 
bond market, a key on-balance-sheet long-term 
funding tool for banks in the euro area through 
purchases in the primary and secondary markets. 
The covered bond purchase programme, which 
targets a nominal amount of €60 billion to be 
purchased between July 2009 and June 2010, 
aims to restore this important funding channel 
for banks.23
3.2  US FEDERAL RESERVE
Contrary to the Eurosystem, the Federal 
Reserve entered the turmoil with a rather narrow 
operational framework in terms of eligible 
collateral and the range of counterparties for 
open market operations. The basic assumption 
on which the US framework rested prior to the 
turmoil was that markets function properly and 
did not require the Federal Reserve to be an active 
large-scale participant in ﬁ  nancing markets on a 
regular basks. Coming from this starting-point, 
the Federal Reserve therefore needed to introduce 
a variety of collateralised lending programmes 
which effectively broadened the number and 
types of counterparties to which, and types of 
collateral against which, it extended credit. 
In the words of the Federal Reserve: “These 
actions are designed to allow ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries to ﬁ  nance with the central bank 
assets they can no longer ﬁ  nance as easily in the 
market. And in this way these liquidity facilities 
reduce the need for those institutions to take the 
types of actions, such as selling other assets into 
distressed markets or withdrawing credit lines 
extended to other ﬁ  nancial institutions that would 
serve to amplify the pressures in markets”.24 
The temporary expansion relates to bank bonds traded on  22 
accepted non-regulated markets; subordinated debt instruments 
when protected by an acceptable guarantee; securities with 
a credit rating threshold lowered from A- to BBB-, except for 
ABSs; and foreign-exchange denominated collateral (yen, pound 
sterling, US dollar) which fulﬁ  l all the other normal eligibility 
criteria. In total, as a result of the measures, the increase 
in collateral amounted to €870 billion at the end of 2008, 
representing 8% of total eligible marketable collateral, while it 
accounted for approximately 3% of total collateral used.
For details see the Decision ECB/2009/16 of 2 July 2009 on  23 
the implementation of the covered bond purchase programme. 
On 10 August 2009, the settled amount of outright purchases 
conducted by the Eurosystem stood at €5.7 billion. See also the 
keynote address by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, 
at the University of Munich, 13 July 2009.
Geithner (2008). 24 26
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A timeline summarising the measures 
implemented by the Federal Reserve is shown 
in Chart 3. The actions can broadly be divided 
into measures addressing strains in wholesale 
interbank markets (those measures in Chart 3 
up to March 2008), and measures aimed at 
enhancing market functioning more generally 
(from September 2008 onwards). 
These two sets of measures are described in 
detail in the following sub-sections.
3.2.1 MEASURES ADDRESSING STRAINS 
IN WHOLESALE INTERBANK MARKETS 
Following the emergence of funding stresses in 
the interbank market in August 2007, the Federal 
Reserve ﬁ  rst modiﬁ  ed and introduced tools that 
were closely tied to its traditional role of 
providing short-term liquidity to depository 
institutions. The Federal Reserve modiﬁ  ed the 
terms and conditions of its primary credit facility 
(discount window), reducing the spread between 
the primary credit rate and the federal funds 
target rate and allowing the provision of term 
ﬁ   nancing, in order to provide depository 
institutions with greater assurance about the cost 
and availability of funding. Despite broad access 
to the primary credit facility by depository 
institutions, the stigma associated with the 
discount window restricted its effectiveness,25 
leading the Federal Reserve to create the Term 
Auction Facility (TAF) in December 2007. 
In the TAF, predetermined amounts of term 
ﬁ   nancing (initially 30 days and later also 
90 days) secured by the broad array of discount 
window collateral are auctioned to depository 
institutions with access to the discount 
window.26 Bi-weekly auction volumes were 
initially set at USD 20 billion but had increased 
to USD 150 billion by the beginning of 2009 
with total outstanding TAF operations at 
USD 467 billion at the end of March 2009. 
In early March 2008, the Federal Reserve 
introduced two measures aimed speciﬁ  cally at 
primary dealers that did not have access to the 
TAF: (i) “single-tranche” repo operations with a 
term maturity of 28 days, intended to ease strains 
in term MBS repo markets; and (ii) the Term 
There has traditionally been stigma attached to the use of the  25 
discount window so that depository institutions were willing to 
pay market interest rates above the discount window rate rather 
than use the discount window. 
As for the Federal Reserve’s temporary open market operations,  26 
the TAF is conducted using a uniform price auction, rather than a 
discriminatory auction. Counterparties submit bids (volume and 
rate) and the Federal Reserve accepts the bids with the highest 
rate ﬁ  rst, until the allotment volume reaches the desired amount. 
The lowest accepted rate is known as the “stop-out” rate, and all 
banks pay the same stop-out rate for what they were allotted. 
Chart 3 Timeline of measures implemented by the Federal Reserve
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Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), intended to 
improve the functioning of the repo market by 
allowing primary dealers to exchange less liquid 
securities for Treasury securities. The single-
tranche term repos could provide funding against 
any open market operation eligible collateral, 
but these operations were used predominantly to 
ﬁ  nance agency MBS debt, as it is typically more 
expensive to ﬁ  nance that Treasury and agency 
debt in the marketplace. The TSLF was more or 
less the Federal Reserve’s existing government 
securities lending programme extended to 
one-month maturity and expanded beyond 
Treasury securities to all open market operation 
collateral, AAA-rated private-label ABSs and 
all other investment-grade securities.27 The 
program addressed two problems: the availability 
of secured funding for primary dealers and the 
shortage of government securities collateral in 
repo markets. Because primary dealers typically 
have funded a very large percentage 
(approximately half) of their balance sheets 
using repo transactions,28 they faced considerable 
liquidity concerns when private repo markets 
closed following the rescue of Bear Stearns with 
an emergency loan from the Federal Reserve. 
The TSLF enabled primary dealers to access 
repo markets so that they could continue to 
ﬁ  nance the large amounts of structured ﬁ  nance 
securities which they held on their balance sheet 
while the same time addressing the potential 
shortage of government securities collateral in 
repo markets.29
When disruptions in secured funding markets 
led to the wholesale market run on Bear Stearns, 
the Federal Reserve also created a standing 
borrowing facility for primary dealers (PDCF), 
akin to the primary credit facility for depository 
institutions, to mitigate concerns that primary 
dealers might be forced to sell assets into illiquid 
markets. The PDCF is an overnight loan facility 
that provides funding to primary dealers at the 
primary credit rate against a broad range of 
highly rated marketable securities (though not 
as broad as the discount window). Created under 
emergency authorisation, the PDCF arguably 
acknowledged the crucial role that these market 
makers played in maintaining liquidity. 
In addition to the TAF, TSLF and PDCF, 
the Federal Reserve also entered into foreign 
exchange swaps with the ECB and the Swiss 
National Bank (SNB). The ECB and SNB 
distribute the US dollars obtained through these 
swaps for use in their jurisdictions. The swaps 
arrangements were initially conducted initially 
in conjunction with the bi-weekly TAF auctions, 
but later expanded to include other maturities 
and other central banks. 
The expansion of credit resulting from the TAF 
and swap arrangements were initially offset, 
mostly by reducing the outright holding of 
Treasury securities, as a part of the interest rate 
targeting regime. However, after the Federal 
Reserve received authorisation to pay interest 
on depository institutions’ required and excess 
reserve balances in October 2008, expansions 
in credit were no longer limited by the overall 
size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. 
The payment of interest was intended “to 
give the Federal Reserve greater scope to use 
its lending programmes to address conditions 
in credit markets while also maintaining the 
federal funds rate close to the target established 
by the FOMC”.30 The Federal Reserve also 
established a near-zero target range for the 
federal funds rate starting on 16 December 
2008 in recognition that the volume of 
reserve balances provided through the various 
programmes was consistent with FOMC’s 
funds rate objectives. 
Initially, when the TSLF was announced in March 2008, only  27 
AAA-rated private label MBSs, commercial mortgage-backed 
securities and collateralised mortgage obligations (CMOs) were 
eligible, but the range of eligible collateral was expanded in 
May 2008 to include all types of AAA-rated ABSs and again 
in September 2008 to include all investment-grade securities 
(i.e. all securities rated BBB and above).
See Hoerdahl and King (2008) and Adrian and Shin (2008). 28 
In July 1997, the outstanding amount of US Treasuries was  29 
USD 4.4 trillion, of which 2.2 trillion were held abroad, and 
0.8 trillion by the Federal Reserve, leaving 1.4 trillion in the 
market. There is certainly a large share that is also held by 
passive investors which need to match long-term liabilities with 
long term assets. It is likely that nearly all these securities were 
already used as collateral in private repo markets. Thus, releasing 
more US Treasuries to the market through the TSLF could have 
helped to increase liquidity.
See Federal Reserve press release of 6 October 2008 (http://www. 30 
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081006a.htm).28
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3.2.2 MEASURES TO ADDRESS THE FUNCTIONING 
OF ASSET MARKETS
Growing counterparty credit concerns and 
intensifying strains in the commercial paper 
market, following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, led the Federal Reserve to introduce 
a second set of policy tools. The new tools 
were aimed at providing liquidity directly to 
borrowers and investors in key credit markets, 
in particular the commercial paper market and 
the ABS market. 
Three separate facilities, the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
Lending Facility (AMLF), the Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), and the Money 
Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) 
were created to support the functioning of the 
commercial paper market and to ease pressures 
on money market mutual funds after one 
large money fund saw the value of its assets 
fall below par (which in theory should never 
happen as they are supposed to be very low risk 
investments). Speciﬁ   cally, the AMLF aimed 
to help money market mutual funds to meet 
redemptions of asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) by providing funding to US depository 
institutions to ﬁ  nance purchases of high-quality 
ABCP from money funds. The MMIFF was 
designed to support a private-sector initiative to 
provide liquidity to money market investors by 
facilitating the sale of money market instruments 
in the secondary market. 
Unlike the MMIFF, which did not involve any 
borrowing, the CPFF, which buys high-quality 
commercial paper at a term of three months, was 
heavily subscribed. The commercial paper 
market was under considerable strain, with 
corporate borrowers ﬁ  nding ﬁ  nancing difﬁ  cult 
to obtain, and then only at high rates and very 
short (usually overnight) maturities. The CPFF 
therefore acted as a liquidity backstop, so as to 
reduce concerns about “rollover risk”, i.e. the 
risk that a borrower could not raise new funds to 
repay maturing commercial paper. By reducing 
rollover risk, the CPFF helped increase the 
willingness of private investors to lend, 
particularly for terms longer than overnight. 
Eligible assets included US-dollar denominated 
commercial paper and ABCP, issued by 
US companies, with a rating of at least 
A-1/P-1/F1.31 In effect, the Federal Reserve 
provided short-term unsecured loans directly to 
companies and other ﬁ  nancial  intermediaries, 
bypassing the normal role of the commercial 
paper market. The CPFF became operational at 
the end of October 2008 and is credited with 
having improved the functioning of the 
commercial paper market, as rates and risk 
spreads have come down and the average 
maturities of issuance have increased.
In addition to the problems affecting the 
commercial paper market, new issuance of 
term ABSs also declined precipitously in 
September 2008 and came to a halt in October 
of 2008. At the same time, interest rate spreads 
on AAA-rated tranches of ABSs soared to levels 
well outside the range of historical experience, 
reﬂ   ecting not only deteriorating fundamentals 
but also unusually high risk premiums. The ABS 
markets had historically funded a substantial 
share of consumer credit and Small Business 
Administration-guaranteed small business 
loans, and there were concerns that continued 
disruption of these markets could signiﬁ  cantly 
limit the availability of credit to households and 
small businesses and thereby contribute to a 
further weakening of economic activity. 
In order to facilitate renewed issuance of 
consumer and small business ABSs at more 
normal interest rate spreads, in November 2008 
the Federal Reserve, in cooperation with 
the US Treasury, which provided capital, 
announced the Term Asset-Backed Securities 
Loan Facility (TALF) to provide three-year 
term loans on a non-recourse basis to holders 
of certain AAA-rated ABSs backed by wide 
Limits were placed on the amount that could be purchased  31 
for each issuer, based on average outstanding issuance in the 
period 1 January to 30 August 2008. If an issuer did not issue 
commercial paper in this period, it was not eligible to access the 
facility. Borrowing from the facility could be made whenever 
required, like a standing facility. The interest rate and fees 
charged on the loans were 100 basis points above the three-
month overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate plus an additional fee 
of 100 basis points if no collateral was provided.29
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range of asset classes, in particular consumer 
and small business recently-originated debt. By 
only accepting ABSs backed by “new” loans, 
the Federal Reserve intended to provide an 
incentive to revive private lending. This was 
in contrast to the Bank of England’s Special 
Liquidity Scheme (see sub-section 3.3) that 
only accepted ABSs backed by “old” loans, and 
which aimed to remove the stock overhang but 
not to stimulate new lending. 
A key feature of TALF loans is that they are not 
subject to mark-to-market or re-margining and, 
as the loan is non-recourse, if the borrower does 
not repay the loan, the New York Federal Reserve 
will enforce its rights over the collateral and sell 
the collateral to a SPV established speciﬁ  cally 
for the purpose of managing such assets. 
The non-recourse nature of the loan enables 
investors to write off the exposure if asset prices 
deteriorate sufﬁ   ciently, thereby limiting their 
exposure and providing a quasi-guarantee. 
This provision of liquidity combined with a capital 
guarantee was therefore intended to provide 
an incentive for a broader range of investors to 
purchase ABSs in the primary market, despite high 
levels of risk aversion and the need to deleverage.
However, the ﬁ   rst monthly auction in 
March 2009 yielded less than USD 5 billion 
of demand for loans, reﬂ   ecting the logistical 
challenges in structuring these complex deals. 
Since then, volumes were USD 10 billion in 
May and USD 11.5 billion in June, falling back 
to USD 5.4 billion in July, while spreads in both 
primary and secondary market have tightened. 
The composition of collateral pledged to 
the various lending facilities of the Federal 
Reserve shows that over half of the collateral 
is comprised of loans to corporations, loans 
for residential house purchases and consumer 
loans (see Chart 4). This is a much higher share 
than for the Eurosystem, which is particularly 
noteworthy given that the US ﬁ  nancial system 
is far less bank-based than the Eurosystem’s. It 
is due to the more liberal eligibility criteria for 
loans under the US framework, in particular the 
eligibility of consumer and residential loans. 
The other main source of collateral for the 
Federal Reserve is private-label ABSs/MBSs 
and government agency MBSs. Overall, 
USD 2.1 trillion of collateral was pledged to the 
Federal Reserve, an amount comparable to that 
pledged to the Eurosystem. 
In conjunction with the TALF programme, the 
Federal Reserve also announced a programme 
to purchase up to USD 100 billion of 
direct obligations of housing-related GSEs 
(Fannie Mae, Freddie and the Federal Home 
Loan Banks) and up to USD 500 billion of 
MBSs backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
and Ginnie Mae. On 18 March 2009, 
purchases of longer-term Treasury securities 
of up to USD 300 billion were added 
to the program and the size of the programme 
for direct obligations of GSEs and MBSs 
was increased to USD 200 billion 
and USD 1.25 trillion respectively.32 
See Federal Reserve press release on 25 November 2008  32 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
monetary/20081125b.htm) and FOMC statement on 
18 March 2009 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/monetary/20090318a.htm) for details. 
Chart 4 Collateral pledged to Federal 
Reserve lending facilities 
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These purchases were intended to provide 
support to mortgage lending and housing 
markets and to improve conditions in private 
credit and ﬁ  nancial markets.33 By 29 July 2009, 
the Federal Reserve had purchased 
USD 229 billion, USD 107 billion, and 
USD 543 billion in Treasuries, GSE direct 
obligations and MBSs respectively.34 
3.3  BANK OF ENGLAND
The Bank of England had traditionally only 
accepted highly liquid government bonds as 
collateral in its regular open market operations 
and its standing facilities. Under this collateral 
framework, banks could not reﬁ  nance  assets 
which had become illiquid, even at penal rates, 
at the central bank. The Bank of England thought 
it necessary to weigh the case for lending against 
illiquid collateral (to relieve pressure in the money 
market) against the moral hazard created by 
providing ex post insurance for risky behaviour. 
However, following the severe liquidity problems 
which emerged in September 2007 at Northern 
Rock, it was clear that there were contagion 
effects affecting the whole banking system and 
that the central bank needed to address a systemic 
liquidity problem. The Bank of England therefore 
decided to relax its stance, and expanded its range 
of eligible collateral. It ﬁ   rst announced that it 
would offer term repo auctions for funds of three-
month maturity against a wider than usual range of 
collateral (not only government bonds but also for 
the ﬁ  rst time private sector securities, AAA-rated 
residential mortgage backed-securities (RMBSs), 
non-securitised prime mortgages, etc.), but subject 
to a interest rate ﬂ  oor of 100 basis points above 
the Bank Rate (i.e. at the existing standing facility 
rate  35) regardless of the quality of the collateral. 
The facility was in effect acting as a temporary 
substitute discount window facility. Four term 
auctions against extended collateral were held in 
September and October 2007, but no bids were 
received from commercial banks, reportedly 
because they feared that their borrowing from 
this liquidity facility would become public, and 
then lead to a similar fate as befell Northern Rock 
(i.e. the same stigma effect that caused problems 
for the Federal Reserve’s primary credit facility 
in the early stages of the crisis).
Towards the end of 2007, tensions in money 
markets had grown signiﬁ   cantly. In order to 
address these tensions, the Bank of England 
announced that it would conduct two special 
three-month longer-term repo operations 
against a wider pool of collateral. The extended 
collateral pool included AAA-rated RMBSs and 
ABS-backed by credit card receivables, AAA-
rated US GSE debt, and AAA covered bonds. 
The use of “own issued” RMBSs/ABSs was 
permitted and assets could be denominated in 
most major currencies. Only the normal range 
of open market operation counterparties was 
allowed to participate, however, not the full 
range of standing facility counterparties. This 
time banks did participate and both operations 
were fully allotted. It seems that, because the 
operation was conducted according to the 
normal, albeit modiﬁ  ed, longer-term operation, 
the threat of stigma had been reduced. The 
extended collateral long-term repo auctions were 
temporarily reinitiated in March 2008, because 
of increased money market tensions following 
the near-collapse of Bear Stearns and again 
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008. The list of eligible collateral 
was expanded several times in October 2008 to 
accept a slightly broader range of securities (now 
also including AAA-rated ABSs of corporate and 
consumer loans, some types of ABCP, and the 
newly-issued bank bonds covered by the central 
government’s guarantee scheme).36
The Federal Reserve’s MBS purchase programme includes  33 
the support of the MBS security dollar roll market. Dollar roll 
transactions consist of a purchase of securities combined with an 
agreement to sell securities in the future and provide short-term 
ﬁ  nancing to the MBS market.
While the purchases of Treasuries and GSE direct obligations were  34 
conducted through competitive auction with the primary dealers, 
purchases of MBSs were conducted through external investment 
managers due to the size and complexity of the MBS programme.
A high interest rate was demanded on the funds as the central  35 
bank continued to consider it important to penalise those banks 
which had imprudently managed their asset and liquidity mix.
Following the extension of the range of eligible collateral in October  36 
2008, there were also changes to the minimum bid rate in the auctions. 
For the previously eligible extended collateral, the minimum bid rate 
remained at the OIS rate as in previous auctions, but for bids against 
the further extended collateral pool, the minimum bid rate was set at 
50 basis points higher than the equivalent maturity OIS rate.31
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In April 2008 the Bank of England also 
introduced a Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) 
to tackle the overhang of illiquid securities 
on banks’ balance sheets as a consequence 
of the ongoing dislocation in securitisation 
markets. The SLS addressed the fact that 
secured wholesale markets, upon which banks 
had become increasingly reliant for funding 
in the preceding years, were now closed. 
Under the scheme, the central bank was in 
effect conducting a type of securities lending 
operation, lending Treasury bills to commercial 
banks on a temporary basis collateralised by 
a similar, although slightly more restrictive, 
range of assets eligible in the central bank’s 
extended collateral long-term repos. The 
banks were also allowed to use “own name” 
securitisation, albeit with an additional 
haircut. One of the key advantages of the 
SLS compared with the extended collateral 
long-term repos was that it enabled the central 
bank to liquefy a much larger volume of the 
assets of the banking system, while at the same 
time not increasing the level of banks’ reserves 
at the central bank; thus it did not have any 
monetary policy impact (which would then 
have needed to be counteracted). 
The SLS has many similarities to the TSLF 
introduced by the Federal Reserve one month 
earlier, but there were also several differences. 
For example, the maturity of the SLS loans was 
signiﬁ   cantly longer and, as mentioned above, 
the eligible collateral in the SLS was limited 
to “old mortgages”.37 The SLS also achieved 
a similar effect to the collateral regime of the 
Eurosystem, but again there are a number of 
key differences. First, and most importantly, 
the scheme is a one-off operation with a ﬁ  nite 
life, while for the Eurosystem the ability to 
swap illiquid assets for central bank money is a 
permanent feature of its framework. Therefore, 
under the SLS, banks could have a greater 
incentive to structure transactions with a view 
to placing them later with third party investors, 
while the Eurosystem may be left with ABS 
collateral which may not satisfy third-party 
investor requirements. Second, unlike the SLS, 
in the Eurosystem collateral framework there are 
very few restrictions on the type of underlying 
assets backing the ABS collateral, in particular 
no requirement that the ABS must be backed by 
“old” mortgages.
Given the long-term nature of the SLS, a 
pricing method was chosen so that there would 
be an incentive for banks to unwind their asset 
swaps as soon as markets returned to more 
normal conditions. The price of the swap was 
the spread between the three-month unsecured 
LIBOR rate and same maturity General 
Collateral (GC) repo rate. Assuming banks use 
the government bonds they obtain in the swap 
to obtain cash in the repo market, they are in 
effect taking a collateralised loan from the 
Bank of England but are paying the unsecured 
interbank rate. When repo markets for MBSs 
opened again, the repo rates for this collateral 
would likely be below the unsecured LIBOR 
rate, providing an incentive for commercial 
banks to redeem the swaps. The size of the SLS 
was initially planned to be GBP 50 billion, but 
total lending by the time the scheme closed in 
January 2009  38 reach GBP 185 billion due to 
heavy demand from counterparties.39 
The collateral consisted mostly of RMBSs and 
mortgage covered bonds, a large proportion of 
which was “own name” bonds.
Both of these measures – extended collateral 
repos and the SLS – were considered to be 
merely as temporary operations. 
But, acknowledging the need to make its 
collateral framework ﬂ  exible enough to cope 
Securities used as collateral in the SLS had to be backed by “old”  37 
mortgages, i.e. mortgages that had been concluded before the end 
of 2007. The facility was intended to solve a “stock overhang” 
problem on banks’ balance sheets but not to encourage the 
banks to engage in new mortgage lending using the same kind 
of RMBSs that had become illiquid. In the TSLF, there was no 
restriction on the age on the mortgages included in the mortgage-
backed securities.
The SLS drawdown period was initially planned to last only six  38 
months, ending on 21 October 2008, but due to the unforeseen 
severe market tensions in October, the SLS closing date was 
later extended by another three months to 30 January 2009. With 
the introduction of the newly-functioning Discount Window 
Facility, which also enabled a swap of government bonds for 
mortgage-backed and other collateral, the SLS was therefore 
deemed no longer to be necessary.
32 counterparties accessed the scheme.  39 32
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with stressed conditions, the Bank proposed, in 
October 2008, to undertake a more long-term 
revamp of its operational framework. First, it 
proposed to make the extended collateral 
LTROs a permanent feature of the framework, 
but with a number of modiﬁ   cations to the 
auction format to ensure that banks pay a rate 
commensurate with the liquidity risk of the 
collateral. Second, it proposed to introduce 
discount window facility (DWF) open to all 
counterparties with access to the existing 
standing facilities but against a much broader 
range of collateral.40 Contrary to normal 
standing facilities, the central bank lends 
government bonds instead of cash against 
eligible collateral (although cash lending might 
be possible in exceptional circumstances). 
Under normal circumstances, it was envisaged 
that the term of the transaction would be 
30 days, although the term was temporary 
extended to one year during the crisis at an 
incremental fee.
The DWF aims to solve several problems. First, 
commercial banks can use it at any time, not 
just on the day of the auction, as was the case 
for the extended collateral long-term repos. 
It therefore provides banks with a more 
reliable and immediately accessible form of 
liquidity insurance. Second, the disclosure 
of information on the use of the DWF 
has been delayed and limited, thereby 
hopefully reducing the stigma associated 
with it, as it would be more difﬁ  cult  to 
identify the commercial banks which 
used it.41 Third, unlike the long-term repos, the 
DWF will not impact on liquidity conditions 
as the central bank normally would not lend 
cash, but government securities (similar to the 
construction of the SLS). Fourth, the DWF aims 
to solve what the Bank of England has termed 
the “time-inconsistency” problem in ensuring 
ﬁ   nancial stability, and thus avoid creating 
moral hazard.42 
As part of its most recent set of turmoil 
measures, the Bank of England also started to 
support asset markets directly via outright 
operations. In January 2009, the Bank of 
England established the Asset Purchase Facility 
(APF) with the initial objective of improving 
the functioning of corporate debt markets. 
The intention was for the Bank of England to 
use the facility to purchase high-quality private 
sector assets which would be ﬁ  nanced by the 
issuance of Treasury bills. On 5 March the 
Bank of England announced that the APF 
would also be used as a monetary policy tool to 
purchase assets ﬁ   nanced by the issuance 
of central bank reserves. The purpose of these 
asset purchases was to increase “the supply 
of money in the economy, ease conditions 
The collateral eligible for the Bank of England’s DWF is  40 
signiﬁ  cantly broader than for the SLS and extended collateral 
long-term repos, but it is still narrower than for both the Federal 
Reserve’s discount window and TAF operations, as well as the 
Eurosystem’s euro credit operations (both the main open market 
operations and standing facilities). Eligible collateral for the 
DWF is classiﬁ  ed in four different categories depending on the 
liquidity and credit quality of the securities: Level A collateral 
consists of high-quality debt securities that are routinely 
eligible as collateral in the Bank’s short-term repo Open Market 
Operations and Operational Standing Lending Facility, as 
published on the Bank’s website; Level B collateral consists 
of third-party debt securities that are, in the Bank’s judgment, 
trading in liquid markets; Level C collateral consists of other 
third-party debt securities, including those that are not trading 
in liquid markets in the Bank’s judgment; Level D collateral 
consists of own-name securitisations and own-name covered 
bonds. All covered bonds and structured ﬁ  nance securities must 
have been rated AAA-rating at issue, and thereafter must be 
rated at least A-. All corporate bonds must currently be rated at 
least single-A.
The central bank will only publish the aggregate average daily  41 
value of government securities lent under the DWF four times a 
year, at the end of each quarter.
If the central bank speciﬁ  es in advance a list of high-quality  42 
collateral against which it will lend, the banking system knows 
that those assets are liquid in all circumstances and therefore has 
an incentive to hold them. But if a bank gets into trouble and still 
faces a liquidity problem after using all its central bank-eligible 
assets, the authorities face a choice between letting it fail or 
lending against a still wider class of assets. Their choice will turn 
on an assessment of the trade-off between the risk of ﬁ  nancial 
instability today and ﬁ   nancial instability tomorrow: possibly 
today if the ﬁ  rm’s failure would have undesirable spillovers to 
other ﬁ  rms and markets; but tomorrow if the ﬁ  rm is salvaged and 
incentives for prudent risk management are diluted. If a bank 
judges that its own failure is very likely to cause widespread 
systemic distress, it is likely to believe that the central bank’s 
collateral policy will be relaxed and so choose to hold less of 
the highest quality eligible assets than otherwise (since they 
carry a lower yield than other assets). In those circumstances, 
the central bank may not be able to adhere to its collateral policy 
(i.e. time inconsistency). For further details, refer to a speech by 
Bank of England Deputy Governor Paul Tucker “The Structure 
of Regulation: Lessons from the Crisis of 2007”, at the LSE 
Financial Markets Group conference on 3 March 2008 (published 
on 25 November 2008).33
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in corporate credit markets and ultimately, to 
raise the rate of growth of nominal demand to 
ensure inﬂ  ation meets” the inﬂ  ation target of 
2% in the medium term. The size of the APF 
has been increased twice and stood at GBP 175 
billion at the end of July 2009.43 
By 30 June 2009, the Bank of England has 
purchased GBP 2 billion and GBP 0.8 billion 
in commercial paper and corporate bonds 
respectively, as a part of the APF. Additionally, 
on 30 July 2009, the Bank of England 
announced plans to buy ABCP in the primary 
and secondary market the Secured Commercial 
Paper facility as a part of the APF. It is intended 
that the latter facility should operate for as 
long as “highly abnormal conditions” persist 
in the corporate credit markets. The Bank of 
England had purchased GBP 96 billion in gilts 
by 30 June 2009.44 
See BoE Market Notice Asset Purchase Facility (http://www. 43 
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/009.htm), 
announcement of GBP 75 billion Asset Purchase Programme 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/019.
htm), announcement of GBP 125 billion Asset Purchase 
Programme (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/
2009/037.htm), announcement of GBP 175 billion Asset Purchase 
Programme (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/
2009/063.htm), news release: Secured Commercial Paper 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/062.
htm), Asset Purchase Facility Quarterly Report 2009 Q2 
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/markets/
apf/quarterlyreport.htm).
See Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2009 Q2 (http://www. 44 
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/quarterlybulletin/m09.htm).34
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4  COMPARISON OF THE CENTRAL BANKS’ 
RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS 
This chapter compares the different responses 
of the three central banks to the ﬁ  nancial 
market turmoil, focusing in particular on how 
accommodative they have been in alleviating 
strains in wholesale interbank markets and 
dislocated asset markets by means of temporary 
operations, or in other words how much 
“insurance” did the central bank provide. 
The assessment of what level of “insurance” 
the central banks provided is conducted based 
on a number of indicators, such as the range of 
collateral, the range of counterparties, the size 
of operations and the interest rate charged.
4.1  CRITERIA FOR MEASURING THE LEVEL 
OF LIQUIDITY INSURANCE PROVIDED 
BY CENTRAL BANKS
The “accommodativeness” of a central bank’s 
operational framework – and hence the level of 
liquidity insurance – can be measured co-jointly 
by ﬁ  ve key factors relating to the design of the 
operational and collateral framework.
The range of eligible counterparties (i) :  The 
broader the range of counterparties with 
access to the central bank’s liquidity-
providing operations, the broader the 
provision of funding liquidity risk insurance 
to the banking systen as a whole. If a bank 
has no access to central bank funding, then 
it has no insurance. Because a bank may 
be more willing to transact with a central 
bank open maket operation counterparty 
than a non-central bank counterparty, there 
may also be positive network externalities 
from having more eligible counterparties, 
as it increases certainty in the system as 
a whole that liquidity risk can be hedged, 
and therefore generates greater liquidity in 
the interbank market.
The interst rate (ii)  : The level of liquidity 
insurance is also dependent on the interest 
rate charged on the loan, i.e. whether banks 
can only borrow large amounts at at a 
“penal” rate or also at more “market” rates.
Size of the operations (iii)  : The larger the 
size of a central bank’s temporary open 
market operations relative to the aggregate 
short-term liabilities of the banking sector, 
the higher the level of liquidity insurance. 
If the open market operations are relatively 
large (i.e. few supply constraints), 
it would be possible for a bank (or group 
of banks) under stress signiﬁ  cantly  to 
increase their borrowing from the central 
bank (substituting their borrowing from 
the market), without absorbing the whole 
allotment of funds and/or paying very 
high interest rates. If, in contrast, the open 
market operation supply is relatively small, 
banks have relatively little ﬂ  exibility  to 
increase their borrowing without meeting 
constraints, e.g. on allotment size or the 
level of rates. It is also likely that if the 
allotment size is relatively small, central 
banks will wish to apply limits to prevent 
a single counterparty from obtaining the 
whole allotment (and thus being in a 
position to manipulate the market). 
Range of eligible collateral (iv)  : The broader 
the range of eligible collateral, the higher 
the level of liquidity insurance. Commercial 
banks, in their stress testing and contingency 
planning for liquidity risk, explicitly take 
into account whether assets can ultimately 
be pledged as collateral in central bank 
operations (both open market operations 
and standing facilities). According to a 
report on liquidity risk management by the 
Institute of International Finance, “ﬁ  rms 
should maintain a cushion of eligible central 
bank or highly liquid assets to generate 
liquidity through repos, through asset sales 
or through central bank pledges”.45 Thus, 
even if an asset is fundamentally highly 
illiquid in the market, but is nevertheless 
eligible for central bank operations, it might 
Institute of International Finance (2007). 45 35
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become, depending on national liquidity 
regulations, a “highly liquid asset” for a 
bank in the context of managing liquidity 
risk. A central bank plays a role in equalising 
the liquidity risk of all assets that it accepts 
as collateral, and the broader the range of 
collateral that a central bank accepts under 
normal conditions, the greater the 
equalisation effect across asset classes. 
Of course, a central bank cannot equalise 
the liquidity risk completely, as it only 
accepts such assets on a repo (rather than 
outright) basis, in only relatively short 
maturities, and in limited, albeit sometime 
large, amounts. Only if a central bank were 
willing to buy outright, in unlimited   
amounts and at market prices would 
liquidity risk be completely equalised 
between different assets. 
Term of the operations (v)  : The longer the term 
or maturity of the operations, the higher the 
level of liquidity risk insurance. Clearly if 
banks had to roll over their central bank 
borrowing on a daily basis, it would create 
uncertainty and a risk for the bank that 
it might not be able to obtain sufﬁ  cient 
liquidity on a certain day. The longer the 
term, the greater the ability of the bank 
to plan how to fund itself and mitigate 
unexpected cash outﬂ  ows. One of the ﬁ  rst 
ways that central banks mitigated funding 
liquidity risk during the ﬁ  nancial turmoil 
was by extending the maturity proﬁ  le of 
their normal operations.
Using these ﬁ  ve criteria, the highest possible 
level of liquidity insurance that the central bank 
could hypothetically provide would involve a 
combination of the following measures:
All banks are eligible to participate in central    •
bank operations;
Unlimited liquidity provision or absorption;   •
Zero width of standing facility corridor    •
of interest rates, i.e. deposit facility and 
marginal lending facility are the same rate;
Acceptance of any type of collateral (with    •
no haircuts applied and pricing according to 
the market)  46; and
Unlimited maturity of borrowing.   •
4.2  APPLICATION OF THE CRITERIA TO THE 
EUROSYSTEM AND US FEDERAL RESERVE
Table 4 summarises these criteria for the various 
Federal Reserve and Eurosystem operations, as 
of 1 April and 29 July 2009 respectively.
The Federal Reserve’s discount window lending 
facilities (i.e. the TAF and the PCF, which 
was modiﬁ   ed to also provide term lending) 
are clearly the most comparable with the 
Eurosystem’s full allotment operations. In fact, 
the Federal Reserve’s PDCF, TSLF and TAF 
programmes, as well as the Bank of England’s 
SLS, DWF and long-term repo operations, can 
be classiﬁ  ed as “subsets” of the Eurosystem full 
allotment temporary operations. 
Based on the aforementioned criteria for 
comparing the extent of liquidity provision to the 
banking sector, the Federal Reserve’s discount 
window operations could, at least at ﬁ  rst sight, 
be perceived as more accommodative than the 
Eurosystem repo operations for the reasons 
set out below.
The range of collateral eligible for the    –
TAF/PCF is broader. In addition to collateral 
that is eligible in the Eurosystem, it also 
includes unsecuritised residential mortgage 
loans and consumer credit loans. Although 
private-label ABSs are accepted as collateral 
for the TAF/PCF, it is unclear whether “own 
use” of ABSs by the originator is allowed for 
TAF/PCF (as is the case in the Eurosystem). 
The range of eligible counterparties for the    –
Federal Reserve is also broader with all 
7,000 depository institutions potentially 
It could even be assumed that the central bank supplies  46 
uncollateralised funds.36
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Table 4 Comparison of extent of liquidity provision via temporary operations of Federal 
Reserve and Eurosystem post-crisis frameworks
Range 
of collateral





charged on loan 




term reﬁ  nancing 
operations





-   “Own use” 
of ABSs and 
covered bonds 




1 April 2009: 
€660 billion 
29 July 2009: 
€797 billion
Unlimited, 






at policy rate 
(but any excess 
must be placed on 
deposit facility at 




Same as above 1 April 2009: 
€1 billion
Unlimited, 





Policy rate + 
100 basis points





Very similar to 
Eurosystem plus 
credit card loans, 
mortgage loans
1 April 2009: 
USD 467 billion 
29 July 2009: 
USD 238 billion
USD 600 billion, 
but most likely 
the programme 
size would be 
increased if 
demand increased. 













Very similar to 
Eurosystem plus 
credit card loans, 
mortgage loans
1 April 2009: 
USD 58 billion 
29 July 2009: 
USD 36 billion






+25 basis points; 
excess reserves are 









1 April 2009: 
USD 86 billion 
29 July 2009: 
USD 3 billion










1 April 2009: 
USD 18 billion 
29 July 2009: 
USD 0 billion
Unlimited, but not 
for systematic use
18 primary dealers Policy rate 
+ 25 basis points
1) The PCF underwent several changes during the period of the turmoil and the conditions of use (i.e. counterparties, collateral, maturity), 
except for the interest rate (which in recent auctions has been around 0.25% higher) are now identical. Since the autumn of 2008, it seems 
that the stigma of using the PCF has been resolved and the lower use of the PCF relative to the TAF is entirely the result of the TAF 
having become less expensive, as the programme size was increased to USD 600 billion and it began to be undersubscribed.37
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able to access the TAF/PCF.47 For the 
Eurosystem, only a subset (2,200 of the 
6,500) of credit institutions can bid in the 
MROs/LTROs.48 Having said this, the 
number of banks which regularly bid in the 
Eurosystem operations has been signiﬁ  cantly 
higher than in the Federal Reserve’s 
TAF auctions.
The interest rate for the TAF/PCF is lower.    –
Currently, US banks can obtain funds in 
the TAF at the Fed’s policy rate (as the 
operations have undersubscribed due to the 
size of the programme) and the PCF rate 
is 25 basis points above the policy rate. 
In comparison, Eurosystem banks can also 
borrow at the policy rate but in the marginal 
lending facility (which only provides for 
overnight borrowing) the rate charged is 
currently 75 basis points above the policy 
rate. And while banks in the US earn the 
policy rate on excess liquidity held above 
requirements, Eurosystem banks only receive 
the remuneration of the deposit facility 
(i.e. 75 basis points below the policy rate). 
In terms of the size of the operations, the    –
TAF was in theory restricted to a maximum 
amount of USD 600 billion,49 while in the 
Eurosystem there is no limit. But given that 
the current TAF volume is USD 133 billion 
below its maximum limit, it does not 
appear to be a constraint (see chart 5). It is 
furthermore not excluded that if demand 
in the TAF were ever to increase to the 
maximum the Fed would quickly expand the 
programme size. Furthermore, there is no 
limit for the PCF.
Overall, the actual amount of credit provided by 
the Fed’s TAF/PCF and under the Eurosystem 
full-allotment operations was similar during 
the  ﬁ   rst half of 2009. On 1 April 2009, 
the Eurosystem provided €660 billion compared 
with the Fed’s USD 525 billion. Including the 
liquidity provided to the primary broker dealers 
through the PDCF and TSLF,50 which are both 
Although the primary broker dealers (such as Cantor Fitzgerald)  47 
cannot use the TAF/PCF, all of the bank holding companies with 
investment banking arms can participate, e.g. Citigroup, JP Morgan 
Chase, Merrill Lynch/Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, etc.
For both the Federal Reserve and the ECB, banks may not have  48 
access to the central bank’s operations if they have decided not 
to fulﬁ  l the limited, operational prerequisites to participate.
The size of individual TAF operations was reduced from  49 
USD 150 billion to USD 100 billion during July and August 
of 2009, with the Federal Reserve indicating that it could 
continue to trim the size of TAF offerings. Although the size of 
the operations has fallen, supply remains higher than demand.
Although the TSLF is only an asset swap operation rather than  50 
a liquidity-providing operation, it can be conﬁ  dently assumed 
that the counterparties will ultimately use government bonds in 
private repo operations to obtain funding.
Chart 5 Use of the Term Auction Facility, Primary Credit Facility and Primary Dealer Credit Facility 





















TAF stop-out rate (right-hand scale)
PCF
PCF rate (left-hand scale)
PDCF
Source: Federal Reserve System.38
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more restrictive in terms of collateral than the 
discount window-related operations, the amount 
of credit extended by the Federal Reserve would 
be USD 629 billion, close to the level provided 
by the Eurosystem. 
Furthermore, two of the Federal Reserve’s 
programmes, CPFF and TALF, go beyond the 
scope of the Eurosystem’s measures. The CPFF 
facilitates direct purchases of commercial paper 
from issuers. While the Eurosystem’s framework 
and policies do not directly support the purchase 
of commercial paper in the primary market, the 
Eurosystem facilitates purchases indirectly by 
allowing banks to act as intermediaries in the 
purchase of commercial paper which is then 
reﬁ   nanced at the central bank.51 The TALF 
programme goes much further the Eurosystem’s 
measures as it involves a non-recourse loan to 
investors, and thus represents a quasi-outright 
purchase of securities in an effort to revive the 
ABS market. 
However, the way in which liquidity is provided 
to counterparties in the two operational 
frameworks has started to diverge again since 
the introduction of the one-year LTRO by 
the Eurosystem and the winding-down of the 
lending facilities of the Federal Reserve in 
the wake of improved market conditions and 
the rapid expansion of the outright portfolio. 
On 29 July 2009, the Eurosystem provided 
€797 billion through its full allotment operations, 
while the amount of credit extended by the 
Federal Reserve via comparable operations was 
only USD 278 billion.
4.3  SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE EUROSYSTEM 
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
There are also a number of special nuances of 
the Eurosystem temporary operations which 
distinguish them from the Federal Reserve’s 
discount window lending.
First, only depository institutions are able    –
to access to the TAF. Primary dealers were 
instead given access to the PDCF and 
TSLF, both of which were more restrictive. 
The PDCF has restrictions on over-usage 
while the TSLF has a programme size limit 
of USD 200 billion. Hence, for primary 
dealers the Federal Reserve’s framework is 
more restrictive.
Second, Eurosystem reﬁ  nancing operations    –
are available at a longer maturity. While 
TAF and PCF made funds available out to 
three months’ maturity, operations in the 
Eurosystem go up to 12 months. 
Third, due to the high level of transparency    –
regarding the eligibility criteria, banks and 
issuers in the Eurosystem know in advance 
that their bonds will become eligible. 
The Eurosystem facilitates banks’ collateral 
and liquidity management by publishing a 
list of all eligible assets (more than 45,000 
individual securities) on its website, updated 
on a daily basis. In comparison, the Federal 
Reserve maintains a higher level of discretion 
regarding eligibility criteria and does not 
publish a daily list of eligible collateral. 
In order to use an asset as collateral, the bank 
must submit it for an eligibility check.
Fourth, the ability to use “own use” ABS as    –
collateral allowed Eurosystem counterparties 
to mitigate their funding liquidity risk 
effectively when ABS markets closed up. 
At the same time, this “own use” has been a 
source of high risk for the Eurosystem, and, 
going forward, is complicating the task of 
getting the euro-denominated ABS market 
to function properly again. The Federal 
Reserve does not allow “own use” of ABSs 
as collateral in its TAF and PCF operations. 
It is also crucial to be aware that many of 
the policy measures the Federal Reserve 
created in the wake of the turmoil will unwind 
automatically as market conditions improve. 
Most of the collateralised lending facilities 
should run off in the natural course of business 
This assumption is supported by the fact that, since the crisis  51 
began, the use of commercial paper and certiﬁ  cates of deposit as 
collateral in Eurosystem operations has increased signiﬁ  cantly39
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as  ﬁ  nancial market conditions recover, as the 
programmes are priced at a premium over 
normal interest rate spreads. In fact, a number of 
programmes are already in this process. Overall 
the sum of TAF, PCF, PDCF and TSLF fell from 
its peak of USD 775 billion in December 2008 
to USD 274 billion at the end of July 2009. Also, 
the Federal Reserve is currently authorised to 
extend credit through PDCF, AMLF and CPFF 
only until 1 February 2010.
Furthermore, the relaxation of collateral 
standards in discretionary operations and the 
expanded scale of term ﬁ  nancing by the Federal 
Reserve (and also in the case of the Bank of 
England’s SLS) are of a temporary nature, while 
the broad range of collateral and large temporary 
operations in the Eurosystem are a permanent 
feature of its framework. 
4.4  COMPARISON OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
COLLATERAL FRAMEWORKS
Although it is difﬁ   cult to evaluate which 
framework has performed better overall during 
the course of the turmoil, particularly given 
the changes made to central banks’ operational 
frameworks, a number of useful observations 
can be made. The Eurosystem adjusted its 
framework much less than the Federal Reserve 
and Bank of England. To a large extent, the 
magnitude of changes to the operational 
framework for each central bank has depended 
on the extent to which countries have been hit 
by the crisis. In this respect, the US and UK 
were arguably more affected, at least initially, 
than the euro area. More importantly, the 
ﬂ   exibility of the Eurosystem’s framework 
was to a large extent a function of historical 
necessity since euro area banking structures 
were far from homogeneous across Member 
States and the extent to which the ﬁ  nancing 
system has developed from a more bank-based 
towards a more market-based ﬁ  nancing system 
differed across Member States. Additionally, 
ﬁ  xed income markets, including the government 
bond market, remain not yet fully integrated. 
As such, the Eurosystem’s collateral framework 
has been forced to cater for these structural 
ﬁ   nancial differences. Furthermore, the latest 
responses by central banks to unfreeze dislocated 
asset markets go beyond temporary operations, 
with all three central banks opting for outright 
transactions to assist market liquidity directly in 
key segments of their respective ﬁ  xed income 
markets.
To the extent that a broad collateral framework, 
as in the case of the Eurosystem, has certain 
merits in terms of immediately mitigating a 
funding liquidity crisis, it also brings with it 
certain challenges. Firstly, the acceptance of 
assets as collateral for which markets remain 
seriously dislocated increases liquidation risk, 
and in the case of “own use” of secured assets, 
it also increases the concentration risk assumed 
by the central bank on its balance sheet. 
Hence, such a collateral framework needs to 
be combined with vigilant monitoring, and the 
risk control framework needs to be constantly 
adjusted to counteract unwarranted practices 
in the use of collateral by counterparties. This 
requires a very sound information base and a 
high level of human resources for monitoring 
ﬁ  nancial market innovations, developing pricing 
models and reﬁ  ning risk control measures. The 
Eurosystem has been aware of an increase in 
residual  ﬁ   nancial risks in the context of its 
collateral framework since the outbreak of the 
ﬁ   nancial market crisis, and has continuously 
redeﬁ   ned its risk control framework 
(see sub-section 3.1).
Secondly, as the Bank for International 
Settlements warned in its 2008 Annual Report, 
the large-scale intermediation of ailing capital 
markets by the central bank may create price 
distortions in the longer term. Making a wide 
range of liquid and illiquid assets eligible for 
central bank reﬁ  nancing may – if not adjusted 
for by the central bank via risk control measures 
and adequate pricing policy – lead to a 
preferential treatment of illiquid assets relative 
to liquid ones, raise the relative price of illiquid 
assets and lead to oversupply and a consequent 
impact on credit allocation. 40
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Third, a collateral framework that allows the 
“own use” of secured instruments in credit 
operations with the central bank as a permanent 
feature, could reduce incentives for bank issuers 
to revive their third party investor base and 
reactivate markets.
Finally, a broad collateral framework risks not 
creating the appropriate incentives for banks to 
manage liquidity risk properly, allowing them to 
divest of highly liquid assets such as government 
bonds in exchange for illiquid assets. How to 
preserve the feature of an effective, immediate 
crisis-mitigation tool, while at the same time 
containing unwarranted market distortions 
and not diluting incentives for prudent risk 
management, is an important area of future 
analysis and policy research.41
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5 CONCLUSION 
Prior to the ﬁ   nancial market turmoil, there 
was a general consensus that there is no one 
optimal way to implement monetary policy and 
that a central bank’s operational and collateral 
framework is shaped by the speciﬁ  c  internal 
and external circumstances that the central bank 
faces. This paper has showed how external 
factors, such as legal constraints, the depth of 
a country’s capital markets and the structure 
of its banking system can signiﬁ  cantly  affect 
the design of a central bank’s collateral and 
operational framework. It has also illustrated 
how internal decisions by the central bank, such 
as whether to primarily supply liquidity to the 
banking sector through outright or temporary 
operations and whether to differentiate collateral 
according to the type of operation, can also 
have an important impact on the collateral 
framework. The interaction between these 
external and internal factors resulted in the 
Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve and the Bank 
of England having very different operational and 
collateral frameworks in the period prior to the 
crisis. In fact, the Eurosystem and the Federal 
Reserve’s frameworks were different in almost 
every respect, in terms of the range of eligible 
counterparties, the type of eligible collateral, the 
size of the temporary versus outright operations 
and the emphasis placed on achieving market 
neutrality. Despite these differences, all three 
central banks were able to implement monetary 
policy in a highly effective way during the 
pre-crisis period. 
Although the recent experience of the ﬁ  nancial 
market turbulence has not undermined this 
conclusion, it has shown that having a “broad” 
collateral framework and a “broad” range of 
counterparties – whether this is a permanent 
feature of the framework or only implemented 
in the event of a crisis – can have substantial 
beneﬁ   ts in terms of an immediate crisis 
mitigation tool.  While the Federal Reserve, 
the Bank of England and the Eurosystem all 
expanded the range of eligible collateral during 
the turmoil, the Federal Reserve and the Bank 
of England, which entered the turmoil with a 
narrower range of eligible collateral than the 
Eurosystem, accordingly had to expand their 
eligible collateral even more. The vast majority 
of the measures implemented by the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of England to alleviate 
strains in wholesale interbank markets and 
dislocated asset markets were included in the 
pre-crisis Eurosystem temporary operations.
However, implementing a broad collateral 
framework and having a broad range of 
counterparties brings with it other challenges. 
It requires very intense monitoring of use of 
collateral practices and tight control via risk 
control measures. Moreover, it needs to be 
ensured that banks manage their liquidity risks 
in a prudent way and do not take unwarranted 
risks in the expectation that the central bank will 
bail them out if they run into liquidity problems. 
Finally, it may complicate the task of restoring a 
proper market functioning as banks might easily 
become overly dependent on the central bank’s 
intermediation function. This is an area of great 
interest to central banks and in which much 
more research still needs to be done.42
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ANNEX
COMPARISON OF THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE MONETARY POLICY OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, EUROSYSTEM AND BANK OF ENGLAND
Eurosystem Federal Reserve Bank of England
Key policy rate/
operational target
Key policy rate is the 
minimum bid rate in the 




The key policy rate is the ofﬁ  cial 
Bank Rate paid on commercial 
bank reserves; the operational 
target is the overnight unsecured 
interest rate.
Standing facilities Yes Yes Yes
- Form and maturity Both a collateralised loan and 
deposit facility; overnight 
maturity.
Primary credit facility but no 
deposit facility.
Lending facility: repo, 
overnight maturity. Deposit 
facility: unsecured deposit, 
overnight
- Access limits All supervised credit 
institutions which fulﬁ  l certain 
operational criteria.
No limit on size of borrowing, 
subject to sufﬁ  cient collateral.
Banks in sound ﬁ  nancial 
condition have access to the 
primary credit facility. 
No limit on size of borrowing, 
subject to sufﬁ  cient collateral.
All banks with pound sterling 
liabilities above a certain 
minimum size, which for 
that reason must place zero-
yielding “cash ratio” deposits 
at the Bank under the 1998 
Act, can have access.
No limit on size of borrowing, 
subject to sufﬁ  cient collateral
- Corridor width Loan facility 100 basis points 
above minimum bid rate, 
reduced to 50 basis points on 
9 October 2008.
Deposit facility 100 basis 
points below minimum bid 
rate, also reduced to 50 basis 
points on 9 October 2008.
Normally 100 basis points 
above the Federal funds target, 
but reduced to 50 basis points 
on 16 August 2007 and further 
reduced to 25 basis points on 
17 March 2008.
Loan / deposit facility 100 
basis points above and below 
the Bank Rate; reduced to +/- 
25 basis points on last day of 
maintenance period.
- Eligible collateral A wide range of public and 
private sector securities and 
non-marketable claims.
A wide range of public and 
private sector securities and 
non-marketable claims.
Central government and 
central bank securities; 
international institution bonds.
Reserve requirements Yes, mandatory Yes, mandatory Yes, voluntary/contractual 
reserve targets
- Reserve ratios Domestic currency/foreign 
currency: 2%
Domestic currency: 0-10%  N/A
- Averaging Yes Yes Yes
- Carry over No Yes No
- Maintenance period Variable length, normally 
4-5 weeks
2 weeks 1 month
- Remuneration Yes, fully remunerated at the 
MRO rate
Yes, fully remunerated since 
the end of 2008
Yes, at the bank rate
Outright operations No Yes Yes
- Function  Currently not used as a 
monetary policy instrument
Traditionally, the outright 
portfolio mirrored the volume 
of banknotes in circulation 
and provided the main way of 
reﬁ  nancing the banking sector. 
But the portfolio has decreased 
in size since the start of the 
turmoil, replaced by temporary 
operations.
To mirror the volume of 
banknotes in circulation.
- Type of assets N/A Government bonds. Government bonds; in the 
future, also foreign currency 
government bonds swapped 
into ﬁ  xed rate sterling.43
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Eurosystem Federal Reserve Bank of England
Main temporary open 
market operations
Yes Yes Yes
- Function Main way of reﬁ  nancing the 
banking sector so banks can 
fulﬁ  l reserve requirements.
Fine-tuning (short-term), 
seasonal swings in autonomous 
factors (longer-term).
Main way of reﬁ  nancing the 
banking sector so banks can 
fulﬁ  l reserve requirements.
- Type of operation Collateralised lending 
(pledge); repurchase 
agreements are only 
marginally used.
Repurchase agreements. Repurchase agreements.
- Counterparties 1,500 eligible banks; 
in practice 400-500 participate 
regularly.
A known set of 20 “primary 
dealers”.
All banks which fulﬁ  l reserves 
requirements with the central 
bank.
- Maturities 2 week MROs; 3 month 
longer-term reﬁ  nancing 
operations (LTROs).
Usually overnight to 14 days; 
up to 65 days allowable.
1-week ﬁ  xed rate repos; 
long-term (3, 6, 9, 12 month) 
variable rate repos.
- Frequency Weekly (MROs); monthly 
(LTROs).
Daily (short-term); weekly 
(longer-term).
Weekly (short-term repos); 
monthly (long-term repos)
- Collateral Same collateral as for standing 
facility.
US Treasury securities, 
US agency bonds, agency-
guaranteed MBSs.
Same collateral as for standing 
facility.
Source: Amended from the document “Monetary policy frameworks and central bank market operations”, Bank for International 
Settlements, June 2008.44
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